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The New Right in Water
Rhett B. Larson*
Abstract
This Article divides all rights into two broad categories—
provision rights and participation rights. With a provision right,
the government makes substantive guarantees to provide some
minimum quantity and quality of a good or service. With a
participation right, the government is legally proscribed from
interfering with an individual citizen’s access to institutions and
resources controlled or held in trust by the state, and the state is
required to facilitate access to those institutions and resources
equally and transparently. A growing number of national
constitutions guarantee a right to water. Without exception to
date, these constitutions frame the right to water as a provision
right. A provision right to water raises serious problems of
enforceability, equity, and sustainability. This Article critically
evaluates the provision right to water and suggests an alternative
participation right in water. The foundation of such a
participation right in water is laid in many nations by the public
trust doctrine, wherein the state holds title to water resources for
the benefit of its citizens. Unlike the typical formulation and
implementation of the provision right to water, a participation
right is sustainable, equitable, and enforceable, and would
facilitate
public
participation,
accountability,
and
experimentation in water policy.
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I. Introduction
Currently, 2.3 billion people live without access to
adequate water supplies and approximately 6,000 children
under the age of five die every day from water-related
diseases.1 Two-thirds of the world’s population, or 5.5 billion
1. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 537, 538 (2006). “Water stress” occurs where inadequate water quantity
or quality prevents water supply from meeting demand during a period of time.
See U.N. Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Water Scarcity, http://www.un.org/
waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (discussing the
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people, are predicted to live in areas of “water stress” by 2025
due to climate change, population growth, and economic
development leading to increased consumption.2 As nations
face increasing water stress, droughts, famines, and epidemics
could lead to greater conflict over scarce and disputed water
resources.3 Water stress represents the preeminent global
challenge of the coming decades.4 Those who are socially or
economically disenfranchised suffer disproportionately from
water stress.5
In response to the growing crisis of water stress in many
parts of the world, there is growing advocacy for a human
rights-based approach to water law and policy at both the
national and international levels.6 For example, the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution
recognizing an international human right to water in 2010.7
global impact of water stress and water scarcity) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
2. Amy Liu, Desalination Is No Panacea, but Holds Potential as Water
Shortage Solution, J. YOUNG INVESTIGATORS (Sept. 2008), http://www.jyi.
org/issue/desalination-is-no-panacea-but-holds-potential-as-water-shortage-solution/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Meredith Giordano, Mark Giordano & Aaron Wolf, The Geography
of Water Conflict and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International
Manifestations, 168 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 293, 294 (2002) (proposing an empirical
model to analyze the impact of water on international conflicts).
4. See Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and
International Law: A River Runs Through It . . . , 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 98
(2008) (discussing Sir John Beddington, the United Kingdom Government Chief
Scientist, who refers to water stress caused by economic development,
population growth, and climate change as the “perfect storm” for a global energy
and food crisis); Christine McGourty, Global Crisis ‘to Strike by 2030’, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7951838.stm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2013) (describing the dangerous combination of environmental
change and increased demand for vital resources) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
5. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Alison K. Guernsey, The World Bank’s
Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration, 41
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 577, 586 (2008) (discussing the World Bank Inspection
Panel’s position that water woes in South Africa are part of the odious legacy of
apartheid).
6. See G.A. Res. 64/292 ¶¶ 5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292 [hereinafter
2010 U.N. Resolution] (acknowledging that access to drinking water is an
integral component of expanding human rights).
7. Id.
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The 2010 U.N. Resolution declared that the “right to safe and
clean drinking water . . . [is] a human right that is essential for
the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”8 To date, fortyone countries recognize a right to water similar to that of the
2010 UN Resolution in their respective constitutions, including
South Africa, Uganda, and Argentina.9
Nevertheless, forty-one counties abstained from signing
the 2010 UN Resolution when it was first introduced, and the
vast majority of nations do not have a constitutionally
protected right to water.10 Reluctance to embrace a rightsbased approach to water policy arguably stems from the
uncertain effect of such an approach. Formulations of the right
to water often leave unanswered the most fundamental and
important questions of water policy, including questions of who
owns water, how to price water, whether to subsidize water
services, and whether such a right is sustainable and
enforceable. The challenge of a rights-based approach to water
policy is how to frame such a right so as to effectively answer
these fundamental questions.
Rights are typically framed in one of two ways.11 On
the one hand, rights could be characterized as negative
8. Id. ¶ 1.
9. See Barton H. Thompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L.
REV. 17, 32–33 (2011) (describing a small but growing trend towards recognizing
a constitutional right to water).
10. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts
Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, by
Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press
Release GA/10967 (July 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga
10967.doc.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (abstaining countries at the time of
introduction include Australia, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece,
Israel, Kenya, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review). The United States expressed
concerns that the Resolution could frustrate efforts to develop a more durable
human right to water on other fronts. See Memorandum from John F. Sammis,
U.S. Deputy Representative to the Econ. & Soc. Council, Explanation of Vote by
John F. Sammis, U.S. Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social
Council, on Resolution A/64/L.63/Rev.1, the Human Right to Water (July 28,
2010), http://www.usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/145279.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2013) (explaining to the President the decision to abstain from
voting) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
118, 121–22 (1969) (discussing the basic distinction between positive and
negative rights); Frank B. Cross, The Error in Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV.
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rights.12 These rights include freedom of speech, freedom from
religious, racial, or ethnic discrimination, and freedom from
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty and property by the
government.13 Such rights are guarantees against government
action, unless the government provides citizens due process and
demonstrates a sufficient compelling countervailing government
interest.14 The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution and the rights enumerated in U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the CP Covenant) are examples of
negative rights.15
On the other hand, rights could be characterized as positive
rights.16 Positive rights include rights to education, to health
care, or to housing.17 These positive rights create affirmative
duties, requiring governments to take action to ensure them.18
The rights enumerated in the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (the ESC Covenant) are examples of positive
rights, which include adequate wages, food, clothing, housing,
857, 863 (2001) (arguing that Berlin’s original distinction between positive and
negative rights has changed over time, especially in regards to positive rights to
government support).
12. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1979) (“If
someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it
to him even though it would be in the general interest to do so.”).
14. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (stating that legal classifications based on race are valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment only if they are tailored to serve a “compelling state
interest”).
15. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI),
at 52–58 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter CP Covenant] (recognizing numerous areas
in which people are free from government interference).
16. See Berlin, supra note 11, at 122 (stating that positive rights grant a
person or entity the authority to order another into action).
17. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 789–90
(2012) (discussing the South African Constitution, which provides positive
rights to sufficient food and water). See generally Kenneth Roth, Defending
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an
International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004).
18. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive rights as the right
to “command government action”).
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health care, and education.19 The distinction between positive
and negative rights, while in some ways intuitive, is problematic
because even negative rights impose an affirmative obligation on
the state to provide some adjudicative and enforcement
mechanisms.20
Instead of this more common distinction between negative
and positive rights, this Article distinguishes between “provision
rights” and “participation rights.”21 Under provision rights, the
government guarantees provision of a certain quantity and
quality of goods or services.22 Provision rights roughly correspond
to positive rights. Under a participation right, the government is
proscribed from interfering with institutions or resources
controlled or held in trust by the state without meeting threshold
levels of transparency, due process, and public participation.
Even in those instances, the state must demonstrate a
countervailing public interest.23 Participation rights roughly
correspond to negative rights. The provision versus participation
distinction is preferable to the more common distinction between
negative and positive rights because it explicitly acknowledges
the key interests and obligations at stake with each kind of right,
as well as the fact that, regardless of the type of right, the state
has prescribed obligations, as opposed to merely proscribed acts,
behaviors, or rationales.24 Another way of understanding the
19. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI), at 49–52 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ESC Covenant]
(recognizing numerous positive rights to basic human necessities).
20. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (discussing the argument that
all rights are positive rights because even negative rights depend on
government action).
21. See generally Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012).
22. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97
VA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2011) (stating that courts in the United States offer a
certain quantity of procedural justice).
23. See, e.g., Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to
Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 874 (2011)
(arguing that despite committing no crime, prisoners of war can be detained
legally and morally because the risks of war outweigh the moral principles
underlying the criminal justice system).
24. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (discussing the theoretical
difficulties with a positive and negative rights dichotomy).
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difference between these types of rights is that provision rights
are rights to some good or service (healthcare, education, food,
water), whereas participation rights are rights in some
institution or resource held in trust by the state for the benefit of
its citizens (courts, regulatory bodies, elections, state-controlled
infrastructure, or natural resources).
National constitutions, legal scholars, and advocates of the
international human right to water typically frame the right to
water as a provision right.25 For example, the U.N. Human
Rights Commission issued General Comment 15 to the ESC
Covenant in 2002, which considers a provision right to water a
prerequisite to the realization of other rights under the ESC
Covenant, including the right to a standard of living and
adequate food.26 Furthermore, where the right to water is
recognized by domestic courts or constitutions, it has been
exclusively framed as a provision right.27
In one sense, the case for a provision right to water seems
simple and compelling. People need water to survive. All other
government actions are irrelevant without basic water provision.
Of course, implementing a provision right to water is not simple.
25. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 1, at 539–40 (discussing the origins of a
positive right to water); Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water:
Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992)
(advocating international action to recognize a human right to water); Peter H.
Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 487–503 (1999) (arguing
that the right to water is a fundamental human right supported by
international law); 2010 U.N. Resolution, supra note 6, ¶ 8 (recognizing the
human right to “safe and clean drinking water and sanitation”). See generally
Anna F. S. Russell, International Organizations and Human Rights: Realizing,
Resisting, or Repackaging the Right to Water?, 9 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2010).
26. See General Comment No. 15, Subcomm. on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, 29th Sess., Nov. 29, 2002 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20,
2002) [hereinafter General Comment 15] (stating that the right to water “clearly
falls within the category of essential guarantees for securing an adequate
standard of living”).
27. See UNITED NATIONS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER: FACT
SHEET NO. 35, 1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet
35en.pdf (“Several national constitutions protect the right to water or outline
the general responsibility of the State to ensure access to safe drinking water
and sanitation for all.”); CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya) (providing a
positive right to healthcare, housing, food, water, social security, and education);
CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [C.P.] ch. 2, § 1,
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#moz
TocId64283 (declaring the human right to water essential).
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In India, for instance, the Supreme Court inferred a
provision right to water from the constitutional right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.28 The Court stated that
“the right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life
and there is a duty on the state under Article 21 to provide clean
drinking water to its citizens.”29 Despite this provision right, only
seventeen percent of the population in India has access to tapped,
treated water, including only thirty-eight percent of urban
residents.30 Eighty percent of the children in India suffer from
water-borne diseases, with a total of forty-four million people
suffering from illnesses related to poor water quality.31 The
example of India illustrates the larger reality—adopting a
provision right to water has not resulted in improved water
provision.32
Actual provision of an adequate quantity and quality of
water thus does not necessarily follow the legal recognition of a
provision right to water.33 A provision right to water may fail to
achieve effective and equitable water provision for many reasons.
First, provision rights in general raise problems of judicial
enforcement.34 The judiciary, as the arbiter of rights, may lack
28. See INDIA CONST. art. 21 (providing due process protection for life and
liberty).
29. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) Supp. 5 S.C.R. 249, at ¶ 3,
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf.
30. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to
Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 981 (2004); see also Ruchi Pant, From
Communities’ Hands to MNCs’ BOOTs: A Case Study from India on Right to
RIGHTS
TO
WATER
&
SANITATION
16–17
(2003),
Water,
THE
http://www.righttowater.info/wp-content/uploads/From-Communities-Hands-toMNCs-BOOTs.pdf (providing numerous statistics regarding water shortages
throughout India).
31. Bluemel, supra note 30, at 981.
32. See David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not
Need Our Charity if We Need Their Water 5–7 (Oct. 8, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15
49570 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (showing through empirical analysis that
constitutional rights to water in twelve countries had little effect on water
availability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336 (2d ed.
1988) (stating that affirmative obligations placed upon governments to provide
basic sustenance to its citizens would be subject to difficulties with judicial
enforcement).
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the relative institutional competency as compared to other
governmental entities, to effectively establish minimum
quantities and qualities and maximum and minimum prices of
goods and services.35 In short, a provision right to water
implicates the “familiar difficulties with judicial enforcement of
affirmative duties.”36
Second, water is unique among other candidates for the
status of provision right. The investments required for water and
sanitation infrastructure are uniquely high, even as compared to
the capital requirements other candidates for provision right
status, like education or healthcare.37 Because water
infrastructure is uniquely capital intensive, the countries most in
need of a provision right to water are also those typically least
able to afford it.38 Furthermore, political pressure on government
rate-makers and government corruption in granting concession
contracts to water utility companies have negative impacts
attracting investment and lending in water infrastructure
financing, cost recovery for water services, and water pricing.39
35. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional
capabilities to determine the proper allocation of natural gas between
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia).
36. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1336.
37. See, e.g., JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD PANEL ON FINANCING WATER
INFRASTRUCTURE, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 6 (2003) [hereinafter CAMDESSUS
REPORT] (stating that because only ten percent of water infrastructure is
financed privately, public funding is important in developing water
infrastructure); John Briscoe, The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigation and
Water Supply Infrastructure in Developing Countries, 15 INT’L J. WATER
RESOURCES DEV. 459, 460 (1999) (estimating that developing nations spend $65
billion annually on water-related infrastructure); Camille Pannu, Drinking
Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 223, 268 (2012) (noting the high cost of upgrading water infrastructure).
38. See generally John Briscoe, The Changing Face of Water Infrastructure
Financing in Developing Countries, 15 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 301
(1999).
39. See David Hall & Emanuele Lobina, Pipe Dreams: The Failure of the
Private Sector to Invest in Water Services in Developing Countries, PUB. SERVS.
INT’L RESEARCH UNIT 43–44 (Mar. 2006), http://gala.gre.ac.uk/3601/1/
PSIRU_9618_-_2006-03-W-investment.pdf (discussing a case of political
corruption in awarding a water infrastructure contract to a Turkish company).
See generally Emmanuel Jimenez, Human and Physical Infrastructure: Public
Investment and Pricing Policies in Developing Countries, in 3 HANDBOOK DEV.
ECON. 2773 (1995).
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Additionally, because water is a common-pool resource that falls
for free out of the sky and often carries significant cultural and
religious meaning, people are generally more reluctant to pay full
price for its provision than for other goods or services.40 These
factors combine to make water services underpriced in most of
the world, leading to serious sustainability problems.41
Underpriced water results in greater water consumption and
water waste, with associated ecological and human health
impacts, and decreases cost recovery on water provision, thus
decreasing investment in improving, expanding, and developing
water treatment and distribution infrastructure.42 Policies
leading to underpriced water, including a provision right to
water, are bad for the environment, bad for the economy, and bad
for the poor.
This Article evaluates the provision right to water, including
the challenges of enforceability associated with provision rights
in general and the unique implications for economic and ecologic
sustainability associated with a provision right to water more
specifically. This Article then proposes an alternative approach
based on participation rights that avoids the questions of
enforceability and sustainability, while enhancing transparency
and stakeholder involvement in the development of water policy.
Essentially, I argue against a right to water, but in favor of a
right in water.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the
rationale behind a rights-based approach to water policy,
distinguishes provision rights from participation rights, and
describes the current predominant formulation of a provision
right to water.43 The rationale behind a right to water is that
40. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1883 (2005) (arguing that the low price of water leads to
inefficient water use).
41. See generally JAMES WINPENNY, MANAGING WATER AS AN ECONOMIC
RESOURCE (1994).
42. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10 (discussing water sector
risks); Charles Sampford, Water Rights and Water Governance: A Cautionary
Tale and the Case for Interdisciplinary Governance, in WATER ETHICS 45, 47
(Marcelino Botin ed., 2007) (stating that because Australian farmers receive
water for free, they use water inefficiently).
43. See General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 16 (delineating a positive
right to water).
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such an approach emphasizes the primacy of water and also
empowers the economically or socially disadvantaged who suffer
most from water stress.44 Part III provides a critique of the
current provision-rights paradigm to the right to water, using a
case study from South Africa to illustrate why this approach is
often ecologically and economically unsustainable and practically
unenforceable.45 In summary, the provision right to water is
unenforceable because courts lack the institutional competency to
evaluate the adequacy of water quality, quantity, and pricing.46
The provision to water is unsustainable because it leads to
underpriced water, and cheap water leads to increased water
consumption and less cost recovery to maintain and upgrade
water infrastructure.47
Using an example from a recent case in Botswana, Part IV
proposes and evaluates an alternative approach based on a
participation right in water.48 A participation rights approach
avoids the problems of sustainability associated with provision
rights while ensuring procedural safeguards in water policy and
empowering disadvantaged communities with an enforceable
right.49
Empowering
disadvantaged
communities
and
establishing procedural safeguards will facilitate fair and broad
stakeholder participation in water-policy development, and
mitigate the effect of government corruption on sustainable and
equitable water policy.50 While a participation right could be
expressly incorporated into a national constitution, existing civil
and political rights jurisprudence and legal doctrines may allow
for the organic development of a participation right in water. In
44. Infra Part II.
45. Infra Part III.
46. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional
capabilities to determine the proper allocation of natural gas between
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia).
47. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10 (describing specific risks
associated with water that lead to overutilization and underproduction).
48. Infra Part IV.
49. See Hubert H.G. Savenije & Pieter van der Zaag, Water as an Economic
Good and Demand Management: Paradigms with Pitfalls, 27 WATER INT’L 98,
100 (2002) (arguing that free water favors the rich at the expense of the poor).
50. See Hall & Lobina, supra note 39, at 44 (discussing a case of political
corruption in awarding a water infrastructure contract to a Turkish company).
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particular, I argue that the public trust doctrine provides a
foundation for a participation right in water. The public trust
doctrine as applied to water means that title to all water is held
by the state for the benefit of all citizens.51 As a doctrine
grounded in Roman and British law and increasingly recognized
under international law, the public trust doctrine provides a
broadly accepted foundation upon which to build a participation
right in water.52 Indeed, something akin to participation rights in
other public trust resources has already been recognized and
enforced in many instances.53
This Article argues that the interest citizens, as beneficiaries
of the public trust, hold in water is akin to a property right, with
the state owing a fiduciary duty to its citizens under the public
trust doctrine to facilitate stakeholder participation in water
policy development and establish procedural protections for water
management decisions, like rate increases or disconnection.
Where a state unreasonably interferes with that quasi-property
51. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–77 (1970) (discussing
the historical development of the public trust doctrine).
52. See Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
291, 297–98 (1976) (discussing the Roman and English law origins of the public
trust doctrine); Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 741; Mark Dowie, In Law
We Trust, ORION MAG., July 2005, http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/
articles/article/122 (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (discussing the historical evolution
of the public trust doctrine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See, e.g., Nat’l Audobon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 731 (Cal.
1983) (allowing the state to revoke prior use permit without implicating eminent
domain because of public trust doctrine); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628
N.W.2d 781, 791 (Wis. 2001) (denying permit to riparian to finish construction of
marina based on habitat protection was not a regulatory taking requiring
compensation because of public trust doctrine); Labroador Inuit Ass’n v.
Newfoundland, [1997] 155 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 93, 113 (Can.) (overturning the
government’s decision to exempt a mining project from environmental
assessment under the public trust doctrine); M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996)
1 S.C.C. 388, 415 (India) (ruling that a lease of public land approving blasting
within a national park violated the public trust doctrine); Waweru v. Republic,
(1996) 1 K.L.R. 677 (Kenya) (holding that government refusal to prosecute a
boat discharging raw sewage into the Kiserian River constituted a violation of
the public trust doctrine); Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792,
797–98 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (holding that logging licenses on public land
violated the constitutionally established public trust doctrine). These cases are
hereinafter referred to as “Examples of Public Trust Doctrine Application
Internationally.”
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right or violates that fiduciary duty under the public trust
doctrine without due process, transparency, and a compelling
countervailing state interest, the state infringes its citizens’
participation right in water. If framed properly, a participation
right in water based on the public trust doctrine would promote
transparency, accountability, and experimentation in the
development of water policy.
II. The Purpose and Formulation of the Right to Water
Isaiah Berlin wrote: “First things come first: there are
situations, as a nineteenth-century Russian radical writer
declared, in which boots are superior to the works of
Shakespeare; individual freedom is not everyone’s primary
need.”54 As Berlin recognized, provision of primary needs, like
water, is a foundation upon which to build a society capable of
protecting individual freedom.55 Applying the rights framework to
the provision of primary needs both elevates their legal priority
and provides legal recourse for the least advantaged to secure
their access to these essential resources.56
Water is a peculiar “primary need” because it is the only
primary need a government is capable of providing for which
there is no substitute.57 There are different kinds of food, energy,
shelter, education, employment, and health care. But only water
is water. There is no person, industry, or nation that does not
depend on it, and it is embedded in every product and service.58
54. Berlin, supra note 11, at 124.
55. See id. (arguing that peasants in ancient Egypt needed the basic
necessities of life more than they needed individual liberty).
56. See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of
Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2010) (arguing that the federal
government should retake control of social welfare law). See generally JULIA
HÄEUSERMANN, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (1998).
57. See Aaron T. Wolf, Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of
International Water Conflict, 23 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 3, 3 (1999),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-8947.1999.tb00235.x/pdf (“Water
is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute . . . .”).
58. Supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Thompson, supra note 9,
at 18–19 (“Water is unique among all resources. Water is essential not only to
life, but to virtually any human endeavor and thus the betterment of society.”).
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Moreover, unlike other primary needs, water moves—it moves
through the air, through rivers, and through the ground without
regard to political borders, and moves through international
commerce.59 Water transports energy, nutrients, minerals,
diseases, and toxins around the world. It is essential to all life on
earth and is a significant cause of death on the planet.60 The
unique nature of water makes it a prime candidate for the status
of a “right,” but that unique nature also makes framing the right
to water uniquely challenging.61
This section discusses the rationale behind a rights-based
approach to water policy, distinguishes participation rights from
provision rights, and describes the predominant provision rights
formulation of the right to water.
A. The Rationale Behind a Rights-Based Approach to Water
Policy
Some scholars have argued against a rights-based approach
to human welfare issues.62 The debate about the efficacy of a
59. See J.A. (Tony) Allan, Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus
Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 4–5 (2003)
(explaining that countries trading in water-intensive agricultural goods are also
trading in the use of water); J.A. Allan, Virtual Water—Part of an Invisible
Synergy that Ameliorates Water Scarcity, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY?
131, 134 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that the “dominant use of
water” is food production).
60. See PETER H. GLEICK, DIRTY WATER: ESTIMATED DEATHS FROM WATERRELATED DISEASES 2000–2020, at 9 (2002), http://www.pacinst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/water_related_deaths_report3.pdf (predicting that “as
many as 76 million people will die by 2020 of preventable water-related
diseases”).
61. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 33 (“[T]he view that water is a human
right remains highly contested. . . . [A]pproximately 20% of all the countries who
are members of the United Nations voted to abstain from the recent declaration
of water as a human right.”).
62. See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1758, 1758 (2008) (introducing the idea that “international concern should
be focused on human welfare rather than on human rights”); Laurence R.
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1857–58 (2002) (illustrating the “unsettling possibility
that the optimal level of compliance with a human rights treaty for a particular
state might be less than perfect compliance”).
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rights-based approach to human welfare in general is outside the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this subsection provides a
brief discussion of the rationales typically given in support of a
rights-based approach toward human welfare issues, like water
policy. This discussion is necessary to evaluate the aims and
efficacy of a right to water, whether a provision right or a
participation right.63 Most arguments in favor of a right to water
rely on one of three rationales—that the right to water fosters
appropriate policy priorities, facilitates equality, and advances
government accountability.64
The Bolivian Water War of 2000 provides useful context to
illustrate these different rationales. The City of Cochabamba in
Bolivia had been suffering from severe water supply, quality, and
infrastructure problems.65 Only half the population was
connected to the city’s water system, while others were forced to
find alternative means to supply themselves with water.66 To
secure necessary funding for improvements, Cochabamba
privatized the city’s water supply and infrastructure.67 The
63. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive and negative
rights).
64. See VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND
PROFIT 15, 27–28, 34–36 (2002) (arguing that the privatization of water
resources “destroy[s] the earth and aggravate[s] inequality” and therefore water
should be recognized as a human right); David R. Boyd, No Taps, No Toilets:
First Nations and the Constitutional Right to Water in Canada, 57 MCGILL L.J.
81, 122–23 (2011) (arguing that recognizing a right to water will “provide a
means of holding governments accountable”); Simon Caney, Climate Change,
Human Rights and Moral Thresholds, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
69, 73 (Stephen Humphreys ed., 2010) (arguing that classifying water as a
human right may give the term “lexical priority” and thus encourage better
policy).
65. See OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA
7–8 (2004) (explaining the city’s historical problems with water and water
supply).
66. See id. at 8–9 (explaining the way Cochabamba’s residents received
water at the time the government privatized the water utility); Simon Marvin &
Nina Laurie, An Emerging Logic of Urban Water Management, Cochabamba,
Bolivia, 36 URB. STUDS. 341, 343 (1999) (detailing the water problems facing low
income communities in Latin America).
67. See Private Passions, ECONOMIST (July 17, 2003), http://www.
economist.com/node/1906828 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (discussing the water
infrastructure projects the Bolivian government desired to accomplish through
privatizing the utility) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Kristin Komives, Designing Pro-Poor Water and Sewer Concessions: Early
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concession contract to the private water utility required increases
in water tariffs and prohibition of alternative methods of water
provision other than connection to the city system.68
The public response to Cochabamba’s prohibition on
alternative water sourcing and increased water rates quickly
escalated into large-scale protests of the concession contract by
early 2000.69 After a prolonged and violent standoff, the
protestors and the government reached an accord, nullifying the
concession contract, repealing prohibitions on alternative water
provision, and turning over ownership and operation of the city’s
water services to the municipal government.70 Water quality and

Lessons from Bolivia 1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2243, 1999) (last
visited Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=629179 (explaining that governments of developing countries often
turn to privatization in order to fund water infrastructure improvements) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water
Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL.
LATIN AM. RES. 99, 107 (2002) (detailing the nature and effects of the Bolivian
concession contract for water provision). Cochabamba issued a concession
contract to the sole bidder on its water project, a consortium led by U.S.
construction company Bechtel, called Aguas del Tunari (ADT). Id. at 106. ADT
signed a forty-year concession contract with the city, with a guaranteed 16%
annual return on investment. Id. at 100, 111. The exigencies of meeting ADT’s
contractual rights resulted in an increase in water rates of 35%. Id. at 107, 111.
The fee structure set up by the concession contract, along with an increase in
supply due to leak prevention, led to some water bills rising as much as 200%.
Id. at 111–12.
69. See OLIVERA & LEWIS, supra note 65, at 33–49 (detailing the standoff
and conflict that eventually lead to water management in Cochabamba being
entrusted to the municipal government).
70. Id. Cochabamba claimed that ADT had abandoned the city and thus
voided the contract as the grounds for nullifying the concession contract. See
Timothy O’Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its
Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 370–71 (2005–2006) (describing the events
leading up to the rescission of the water contract between the Bolivian
government and ADT). ADT brought a claim against the government of Bolivia
in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
claiming breach of the concession contract and violation of international law.
See Amanda L. Norris & Katina E. Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private
Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water
War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 30, 42 (2010) (providing an account of ADT’s
actions after water services in Cochabamba were turned back over to the
municipal government).
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water services remain problematic in Cochabamba, with more
than half of the city’s population unconnected to services.71
The Cochabamba water conflict illustrates the three main
rationales for a rights-based water policy. The first rationale is
that a right to water serves as a bulwark against inequity.72
Advocates fear that water policy driven by profit will make water
less affordable for the poor.73 Empirical studies indicate that
privatization typically does lead to increased water rates.74 There
are several reasons for this, including the political pressure on
public systems to maintain low rates and the necessity of private
water utilities to see a return on large up-front investments in
infrastructure expansion and refurbishment (with increased rates
often guaranteed in government contracts).75 This raises the
concern that private water companies will neglect poorer
communities because of the greater likelihood of cost recovery for
improvements and services in wealthier areas.76 A rights-based
approach is thus partially a response to the perceived economic
inequalities arising from privatization, whereby water is
guaranteed as a right regardless of ability to pay.77 Nevertheless,
71. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Regrets IMF Experiment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-water.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (“[H]alf of the 600,000
people in Cochabamba remain without water, and those who do have service
have it only intermittently, some as little as three hours a day.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); MICHAEL J. ROUSE, INSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
141–42 (2007) (detailing the state of Cochabamba’s water supply after the failed
attempt at privatization).
72. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 38 (explaining the claim that anything
other than a rights-based approach to water policy will result in gross
disadvantage to the world’s poor).
73. See id. (“[A]dvocates fear that privatized water companies will make it
more difficult for the poor to obtain water directly from urban systems.”).
74. See Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and
Sanitation Sector, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 166 (2005) (“[M]uch of
the empirical literature on [private sector participation] in [water and sewer]
service delivery documents increases in monthly service fees following
privatization.”).
75. See id. at 165–67 (explaining the reasons behind price increases when
water services are privatized).
76. See id. at 165 (explaining that providing water services to the poor
must be prioritized when privatization takes place because there will be less
economic incentive to serve these communities).
77. See Boyd, supra note 64, at 112 (“There are a number of reasons why it
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the Cochabamba example illustrates that inequity existed before
privatization, and persists under the current publicly owned
water system in Cochabamba.78 In any event, a rights-based
approach to water policy is most often justified on the grounds
that it guarantees a minimum quantity and quality of water for
all, regardless of ability to pay.
The second rationale relates to the idea of putting “first
things first,” as Berlin suggests.79 When the label “right” is
attached to a public policy issue, the label gives that issue “lexical
priority.”80 Water is thus often characterized as a right because it
is essential to the realization of all other rights and a
precondition for economic development.81 Additionally, water is
traditionally most closely associated with environmental law.82
Applying the “rights” label elevates water relative to other policy
priorities
by
appealing
to
a
constituency
beyond
environmentalists.83
The “putting first things first” rationale for rights-based
water policy is evident in the Cochabamba example on both
sides.84 Advocates of privatization argued that it would attract
investment in improving water quality and infrastructure,
essential to providing a foundation for other economic

is important to recognize that access to safe drinking water is a legally protected
human right, rather than a commodity or a service provided on a charitable
basis.”).
78. Supra note 71 and accompanying text.
79. Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. See Caney, supra note 64, at 73 (using the term “lexical priority” to
argue that “human rights generally take priority over moral values”); Daniel
Bodansky, Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010) (discussing the possibility that human rights
have “lexical priority” in the context of climate change and environmental law).
81. General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 1. General Comment 15
provides that sufficient clean water is a human right because it is
“indispensable for leading a healthy life in human dignity” and a “prerequisite
to the realization of all other human rights.” Id.
82. See Bodansky, supra note 80, at 512–14 (contrasting environmental
and human rights law as applied to the issue of climate change).
83. See id. at 518 (“[C]haracterizing something as a human rights problem
elevates its standing relative to other issues. It gives the problem greater moral
urgency and appeals to an additional constituency beyond environmentalists.”).
84. Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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development and the ultimate realization of expanded rights.85
On the other hand, protestors argued that a right to water
guaranteed provision of adequate water as a prerequisite to any
other development goal, and high tariffs driven by profit demands
of investors violated that right.86
The third rationale for recognizing a right to water is to
facilitate government accountability and transparency.87 This
rationale speaks to a fundamental doctrine of water law in many
parts of the world—the public trust doctrine.88 Under the public
trust doctrine, title to water resources is held by the state as
trustee for the benefit of citizens, with a state obligation to
manage water resources for the general public welfare.89 The
public trust doctrine, though applied in different ways in
different nations, is a recognized legal doctrine in much of the
world, including India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda,
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada.90 A
85. See Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water
Privatization Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America,
15 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 87, 108 (2003) (“Most countries have been under
substantial donor pressure to privatize, in order to access loans or debt relief. . . . In
Tanzania, the World Bank has recommended improvements . . . in order to attract a
private sector operator, but is not willing to grant further financial assistance until
one is in place.”).
86. See Bluemel, supra note 30, at 967 (describing the protests against
privatizing water services due to the risk poorer communities face of either higher
prices or less service); Juan Miguel Picolotti, The Right to Water in Argentina (Nov.
5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (advocating for an internationally recognized
right to water) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); THE
COCHABAMBA DECLARATION, Dec. 8, 2000 [hereinafter COCHABAMBA DECLARATION],
available at http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/imf/bolivia/cochabamba.
htm#declaration (“Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be
guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be commodified,
privatized or traded for commercial purposes.”).
87. See Boyd, supra note 64, at 122–23 (arguing that recognizing a right to
water will “provide a means of holding governments accountable”).
88. See Nanda & Ris, supra note 52, at 297–98 (explaining how the public trust
doctrine could function if used for environmental protection). See generally Sax,
supra note 51.
89. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining the public trust doctrine as
it relates to water rights).
90. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 745 (“In [India, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Canada], the [public trust] doctrine has become equated with environmental
protection and is frequently entrenched in constitutional and statutory

2200

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013)

rights-based approach may provide citizens with a potential
remedy against mismanagement by the trustee of public trust
resources.91 Opponents of the Cochabamba concession relied on
the public trust doctrine in their arguments opposing
privatization of the Cochabamba water and infrastructure, noting
that water is “a public trust to be guarded by all levels of
government.”92
These three rationales—equity, priority, and accountability—
also influence how a right to water is framed, whether as a
provision right or as a participation right.93 It is to that
distinction that this Article now turns.
B. Delineating Provision Rights and Participation Rights
The previous subpart enumerates possible answers to the
question “Why recognize a right to water?” This subpart discusses
two types of rights in which the right to water could be
categorized. These two types of rights are provision rights and
participation rights.94
“Provision rights” are interests of individuals or communities
that a state must satisfy, or obligations or duties owed by the
state to individuals.95 These interests and obligations typically
relate to fulfilling needs for certain “primary goods” essential for
provisions.”).
91. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining that if the government
was considered a trustee of a public trust, it would have a “responsibility to
manage water for the interests of the public and, as a result, [would] hold[] [a]
more restricted ownership right”).
92. COCHABAMBA DECLARATION, supra note 86.
93. For criticisms of the commodification of water resources, see MAUDE
BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE
FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER 58–62, 91–101 (2007), which argues that privatization
will never be able to provide water for the poor and that it has been a mistake to
attempt to privatize water services. See also SHIVA, supra note 64, at 15, 27–28,
34–36 (“Market solutions destroy the earth and aggravate inequality. The
solution to an ecological crisis is ecological, and the solution for injustice is
democracy. Ending the water crisis requires rejuvenating ecological
democracy.”).
94. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive and negative
rights).
95. See generally Hellen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:
The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999).
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realizing other rights and responsibilities.96 Essentially, the
government ensures basic access to primary goods because
certain personal freedoms are worth little to the least advantaged
unless first guaranteed a baseline supply of primary goods
(Berlin’s “boots before Shakespeare,” except in this case, it is
“water before freedom of religion”).97 This baseline supply is often
called a “minimum core” of a primary good essential to support
life and basic human dignity.98 Governments ensure access to a
minimum core of primary goods by means of provision rights. The
ESC Covenant’s guarantees of access to health care, education,
housing, and food are classical formulations of provision rights.99
Provision rights are utilitarian and consequentialist because the
obligation to meet a minimum core of primary goods is aimed at
achieving certain outcomes.100
Participation rights, on the other hand, are by nature
deontological and independent of the state and its desired ends of
social good.101 The essential distinction between participation
rights and provision rights is that states guarantee provision
rights when that provision serves the general interest, whereas
96. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“[S]uppose that the
basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that
every rational man is presumed to want. . . . For simplicity, assume that the
chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties, and
opportunities, and income and wealth.”).
97. Id.; supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Sylvia F. Liu,
American Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Federal Obligation to Protect
Tribal Water Resources and Tribal Autonomy, 25 ENVTL L. 425, 439–40 (1995)
(discussing the idea of water as a primary good in the context of the American
Indian reserved water rights doctrine).
98. See George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and
Its Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National Jurisprudence,
8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 127, 154–55 (2011) (“Essentially . . . [the minimum
core concept] posits that there are degrees of rights fulfillment, and that one of
these degrees is a definable, basic threshold—or for our purposes, a minimum
legal content—for socio-economic rights.”).
99. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
100. See Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights
in China, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 359, 360–61 (1995) (“[Participation rights] are
deontological in character, whereas . . . [provision rights] are consequentialist or
utilitarian.”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1759 (1988) (arguing for redistribution using positive rights
up to a Pareto-optimal point, or “inequality that pays for itself”).
101. See Peerenboom, supra note 100, at 360–61 (“[Participation rights] are
deontological in character . . . .”).
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citizens hold participation rights as a protection against
government interference with certain interests except within very
limited, prescribed legal boundaries, regardless of the interests of
the general citizenry.102 The CP Covenant’s guarantees of
freedom of religion, freedom from racial, gender, or ethnic
discrimination, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of property are classical formulations of participation
rights.103
Commentators often draw the distinction between the two
types of rights as being “freedom to” rights (positive rights) and
“freedom from” rights (negative rights).104 Put differently,
provision rights require the government to take action, unless
compelling countervailing considerations are demonstrated (for
example, impossibility because of limited resources), whereas
participation rights proscribe government action, unless
compelling countervailing considerations are demonstrated (for
example, freedom of speech unless interests of safety outweigh, as
in shouting “fire” in a crowded theater).105 This Article draws the
distinction between rights “to” some good or service (provision
rights), and rights “in” an institution, resource, or process held in
trust and controlled by the state for the benefit of its citizens
(participation rights).106
These are helpful distinctions, but difficult to clearly define.
Even enforcement of provision rights requires the provision of
state resources, and the availability of participation rights
102. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 269 (“A successful claim of right, in the
strong sense . . . has this consequence. If someone has a right to something, then
it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it would be in the
general interest to do so.”).
103. CP Covenant, supra note 15. The distinction between positive rights
and negative rights is a difficult one to draw. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864
(contrasting positive rights, which command government action, with negative
rights, which require freedom from government intervention).
104. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (explaining that a positive right is a
“claim to something” and a negative right is a “right that something not be done
to one”).
105. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
106. The difference between these two types of rights is similar to the
difference between an individual buying a boat (“You have to give me that
boat.”), and an individual buying an ownership interest in a company that owns
a boat (“I get a say in how that boat is used.”). See Cross, supra note 11, at 864
(providing an overview of positive and negative rights).
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requires provision of an institution facilitating participation
(courts, agencies, elections, informal stakeholder processes,
etc.).107 As such, for purposes of this Article, the distinction
between participation rights and provision rights is a distinction
based not solely on the traditional “negative” and “positive”
obligations of the state but also between the duties and
appropriate remedy for violating the right at issue.108 Provision
rights have substantive duties and remedies, whereas
participation rights have procedural duties and remedies.109 The
substantive duty of a provision right is provision of the good or
service, and the remedy for the violation of a provision right is
provision of the minimum core of goods or services guaranteed by
the right.110 The substantive duty of a participation right is
forbearance of state interference with guaranteed freedoms,
absent a compelling state interest, and provision of the necessary
process to facilitate participation in policy development and
enforcement of infringements of freedom.111 The remedy for the
infringement of a participation right is the provision of due
process
and
demonstration
of
sufficiently
compelling
countervailing public interest.112 Where the government cannot
demonstrate such a countervailing interest or cannot provide
such due process, the government is precluded from interfering
with the interest at issue.113
107. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (illustrating the difficulty of
distinguishing positive and negative rights in the context of the claim that “all
rights, including negative ones, require government enforcement”).
108. See, e.g., Lawrence Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural
Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 332–
33 (1987) (illustrating the difficulty in differentiating a constitutionally
protected right and a revocable privilege).
109. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. See Cross, supra note 11, at 868 (explaining that a positive right would
not exist without a government to provide it); McGraw, supra note 98, at 154–55
(framing the right to water as a “positive norm” requiring provision of a
“minimum core” of water).
111. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–68 (discussing the implications of
positive and negative rights and concluding that negative rights require the
government to abstain from interfering with those rights).
112. See id. at 867–68 (describing the process by which negative rights are
provided by the United States Constitution).
113. See id. at 876 (arguing that constitutional rights “do not bestow rights
upon individuals to take some action but only bestow rights to be free from
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C. The Predominant Provision Rights Approach to Water
Scholars, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and
water policy advocates have generally framed the right to water,
at both the international and domestic level, as a provision
right.114 As such, international and domestic formulations of a
right to water typically consider water a compelling interest that
governments should progressively provide, subject to available
resources, in language similar to that of the 2010 U.N.
Resolution.115 Legal scholars writing in the field have almost
universally framed an international human right to water as a
provision right.116 Similar arguments have been echoed in
scholarship describing or advocating a provision right to water at
the national level.117
certain rules limiting that action”).
114. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in
the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship,
33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 836–37 (2009) (explaining that
water supply should be held in trust by the government and provided to the
population through improved infrastructure); Implementing the Human Right to
Water in the West: Conference Report, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2011)
[hereinafter Willamette Conference Report] (concluding that the government has
an obligation to provide water to its citizens, if not to every remote area, at least
to designated locations where it can be accessed); Montgomery F. Simus &
James G. Workman, The Water Ethic: The Inexorable Birth of a Certain
Alienable Right, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 471 (2009) (arguing that an informal
right to water has existed and should be allowed to grow into a more defined
right in the future). But see Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights:
Indigenous Peoples’ Religious-Rights Claims to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 95 (2011) (asserting that the right to water can be argued
as a liberty right, in the context of religious affiliations with water in many
cultures).
115. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Willamette Conference Report, supra note 114, at 29 (“[T]his
conception of the public trust as negative right contrasts with the human right
to water which is generally regarded as a positive right, imposing a duty on the
government to act in such a manner as to assure access to water and
sanitation.”); McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 7 (arguing that “[a]ccess to adequate
amounts of safe, useable fresh water” should be recognized as a right and
provided to the population); McGraw, supra note 98, at 154–55 (framing the
right to water as a “positive norm” requiring provision of a “minimum core” of
water.).
117. See, e.g., Vrinda Narain, Water as a Fundamental Right: A Perspective
From India, 34 VT. L. REV. 917, 923 (2009) (“[I]t might be more effective to
articulate the right to water as a positive right rather than as a negative
right.”).
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The normative and descriptive positions taken by legal
scholars are largely reflected in domestic law relating to the right
to water.118 Currently, forty-one nations have “enshrined the
right to water within their national constitutions, or have framed
the right explicitly or implicitly within national legislation.”119
For example, Article 43 of the Constitution of Kenya120 provides
that “[e]very person has the right . . . to clean and safe water in
adequate quantities.”121 Article 5 of Indonesia’s Law on Water
Resources122 provides that the state guarantees individual access
and availability of water for everyone residing within the
nation.123 Article 66(2) of the Constitution of Ecuador124
recognizes the right to “clean water.”125 In each case, however, the
right is subject to progressive realization and available
resources.126 The constitutions of both Uganda and Zambia move
even further from the rights rhetoric to the “compelling interest”
rhetoric, by framing the public interest in water as a government
“objective” or “endeavor,” subject to available resources.127
118. See infra notes 119–31 (discussing provision and participation rights in
water as provided by domestic constitutions, statutes, and judicial opinions).
119. See The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law,
RIGHTTOWATER.INFO (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.righttowater.info/progress-sofar/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (listing
forty-one nations that have recognized water rights in constitutions, national laws,
executive proclamations, judicial decisions, and proposed legislation) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. CONSTITUTION, art 43(1)(d) (2010) (Kenya).
121. Id.
122. Law on Water Resources, No. 7 of 2004 (Indon.), reprinted in 2 L. ENV’T &
DEV. J. 118, 122 (2006) [hereinafter “Water Resources Law”], http://www.leadjournal.org/content/06118.pdf.
123. See id. (“The State guarantees everyone’s right to obtain water for their
minimum daily basic needs in order to achieve a healthy, clean, and productive
life.”).
124. CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.] art. 66(2),
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#
mozTocId64283.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. arts. 3(1), 11(8) (mandating that the right to water, like all
other constitutional rights, “shall be developed progressively” through standards,
case law, and public policy).
127. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (1995) arts. I, XIV(b),
http://www.uganda.at/Geschichte/verfassung_der_republik_Uganda_2008.pdf
(establishing the right to “clean and safe water” as an “objective” that will “guide”
the state in making and implementing policy decisions); CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991
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Often, nations may lack an express right to water but infer
such a right from other express rights on the grounds that the
realization of any right depends on provision of a minimum core
of primary needs.128 As noted above, the Supreme Court of India
inferred the right to water from other express constitutional
rights.129 A similar approach of judges inferring a provision right
to water from other express rights has been arguably observed in
Pakistan130 and Bangladesh.131
The right to water under international law is similar to the
right in India because, as in India, the right to water under
international law is not express but instead must be considered
implicit within other express provision rights.132 For example, the
U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (HR Declaration)
states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”133 A
right to water is arguably implied within the right to a standard
(as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) § 111, 112(d), http://www.
parliament.gov.zm/downloads/VOLUME%201.pdf (stating that the government
“shall endeavor” to provide clean and safe water, but that this policy principle is
not “legally enforceable” in any court or tribunal).
128. See, e.g., Monique Passelec-Ross & Karin Buss, Water Stewardship in
the Lower Athabasca River: Is the Alberta Government Paying Attention to
Aboriginal Rights to Water?, 23 J. ENVT’L L. & PRAC. 69, 70 (2011) (discussing
how provincial governments in Canada have inferred aboriginal water rights
from express constitutional guarantees to a right of subsistence on traditional
lands).
129. See Chameli Singh v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053
(India) (stating that the right to water is implied by the “right to life enshrined
under Article 21” of the Indian Constitution); INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.”).
130. See McGraw, supra note 98, at 176–77 (discussing General Secretary v.
Director, (1994) SCMR 2061 (Pak.), in which the Pakistani Supreme Court
declared that the right to have water free from pollution is essential to life
itself).
131. See id. at 175 (discussing Farooque v. Bangladesh (Radioactive Milk
Powder), (1996) WP 92/1996 S.C. ¶ 20 (Nepal), in which the Bangladeshi
Supreme Court declared that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of
pollution-free water).
132. See McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that right to water must be
inferred from an existing treaty or charter because such a right is not expressly
provided by existing international law).
133. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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of living, because without water there is no living at all.134
Indeed, on September 30, 2010, the U.N. Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) inferred from the HR Declaration that a right to water
was “inextricably related to . . . the right to life and human
dignity.”135
Article 11 of the ESC Covenant recognizes a right to an
adequate standard of living, health, food, and housing.136 The
U.N. inferred a provision right to water from these guarantees in
2002, under General Comment 15 to the ESC Covenant.137 The
drafters of General Comment 15 draw the right to water from
other express provision rights under the ESC Covenant, finding
that the right to water is a “prerequisite for the realization of
other human rights,” and “clearly falls within the category of
guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of
living . . . . The right to water is also inextricably related to the
right to the highest attainable standard of health . . . and the
rights to adequate housing and adequate food.”138 The ESC
Covenant, however, requires only that states “take steps . . . to
the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the [ESC Covenant].”139
Some have also argued that the provision right to water has
arisen as an independent right based on “customary international

134. See McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 8 (“It seems obvious that such a
standard of living could not exist without an adequate supply of water suitable
for drinking.”).
135. Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, Rep. of the Human Rights Council,
15th Sess., Sept. 13–Oct. 14, A/HRC/15/60, at 22–23 (Oct. 31, 2011). The 2010
U.N. Resolution is similarly based on a right to water implied within the
positive rights set forth in the ESC Covenant. See 2010 U.N. Resolution, supra
note 6 (referencing General Comment 15 by the UNHRC and the ESC Covenant
immediately before recognizing the right to safe and clean drinking water).
136. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 50 (“The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing . . . .”).
137. See General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 1 (stating that realization of
the right to water is a “prerequisite for the realization of other human rights”
recognized in the ESC Covenant).
138. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
139. ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 49.
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law.”140 “Customary international law” means a “general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation to such a degree as to effectively bind states in
general.”141 For example, the Dublin Statement, a U.N. document
on water management, declares that it is “vital to recognize the
basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and
sanitation at an affordable price.”142 However, despite the
growing voices favoring an express provision right to water as
customary international law, few countries recognize an
independent provision right to water; therefore, the right to water
has likely not achieved the status of customary international
law.143 As such, to the extent a right to water exists in
international law, it is implied by existing provision rights.144
Such an implied right mirrors the way in which the right to water
is framed in domestic constitutions and legal scholarship, as a
provision right provided by governments subject to progressive
realization and available resources.145 The nature of the right to
140. See Sara De Vido, The Right to Water As an International Custom: The
Implications in Climate Change Adaptation Measures, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REV. 221, 224–25 (2012) (“Considering the evolution of State practice, national
and international jurisprudence, and the activities of several international
bodies, it is possible to affirm that at least the core content of the human right
to water . . . has achieved the status of a customary international norm.”).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
142. International Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin, Ir.,
Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin Statement and Report of the Conference, at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/112, Annex I (Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter The Dublin
Statement],
http://docs.watsan.net/Scanned_PDF_Files/Class_Code_7_Confer
ence/71-ICWE92-9739.pdf.
143. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water:
Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates,
4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 354 (2005) (“Although water is not yet an
individual right under customary international law, the amount of attention it
has received indicates that it is moving in that direction.”).
144. See De Vido, supra note 140, at 361 (arguing that a human right to
water is implied by existing provision rights to life and health contained within
the ESC Covenant).
145. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.]
arts. 3(1), 11(8), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/
Ecuador/english08.html (establishing the progressive realization rule in
Ecuador); cf. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual
Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to
Pharmaceuticals: Creating A Legal Duty to Supply Under A Theory of
Progressive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 755, 843 (2004)
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water as an implied right is significant, because evaluation of
water policy is thus inherently linked to provision of other goods
or services rather than independently evaluated, and the right to
water, as implicit rather than explicit, is given lower lexical
priority in policy debates.146
III. The Limitations of a Provision Right to Water
To the extent the rights framework is employed solely to
emphasize the need for water, such a framework is of limited
value.147 The right to water cannot mean only a guarantee of
water sufficient to keep a person alive.148 Every living person
already has that. The question then is not whether people have or
need enough water to live—that is both obvious and moot. The
question is one of knowing the amount, quality, access,
affordability, and allocation of water sufficient to achieve some
standard of living, and the unique localized social and
hydrological conditions affecting how that standard is
determined.149

(stating that the ESC Covenant guarantees to health and well-being—provision
rights from which the right to water is derived—are “subject to progressive
realization and available resources”).
146. See De Vido, supra note 140, at 225 (insinuating that the current
“fragmented” approach to the right to water is “a consequence of the
consideration of the human right to water as dependent [upon] other rights”).
147. See Brett Hartley & Heather J. Van Meter, The Human Right to Water:
Proposal for A Human Rights-Based Prioritization Approach, 19 WILLAMETTE J.
INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 66, 85 (2011) (arguing that if the right to water is
predicated on the right to life alone, such a right would be “of little comfort to
the millions . . . [with] disease, chronic illness, and shortened life expectancy”
caused by shortages of potable water).
148. See id. (implying that a water rights structure that fails to promote
quality of life in addition to the ability to live does not meet the adequate
standard of living mandate enshrined in the ESC Covenant).
149. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 404 (3d
ed. 1989) (recognizing that local hydrological conditions will have varying
degrees of impact on water rights); Melina Williams, Privatization and the
Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469,
498–500 (2007) (addressing issues of affordability, access, and allocation in an
analysis of Bolivia’s attempt to uphold the standard of living outlined in General
Comment 15 after privatizing water delivery in Cochabamba).
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The recent decision in the South Africa’s Constitutional
Court in Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg150 illustrates the
challenges of relying on a provision right to water to achieve the
objective of water policy and meet the interests of citizens.151
South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt a
constitutionally guaranteed right to water.152 Under Section 27 of
the South African Constitution, “[e]veryone has the right to have
access to . . . sufficient food and water.”153 Importantly, Section 27
of South Africa’s Constitution provides a guarantee conditioned
upon “progressive realization” similar to those guarantees under
the ESC Covenant and other domestic constitutions discussed
above.154
The Mazibuko case centers on Phiri, a historically black and
poor township of over one million residents in the City of
Johannesburg with a disproportionately degraded and
inadequate water infrastructure.155 Since 2001, the City has
satisfied the constitutional guarantee of access to sufficient water
through its Free Basic Water policy, which supplied six kiloliters
of water (intended to equal about twenty-five liters per person per
day) to each accountholder in Phiri.156 However, because of leaky
150. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf.
151. See id. at 24 para. 48 (attempting to determine how much water the
government must provide in order to meet the provision right to water
guaranteed in the South African Constitution).
152. See Andrew Magaziner, The Trickle Down Effect: The Phiri Water
Rights Application and Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing the South
African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 509, 580
(2008) (“South Africa was one of the first nations to explicitly reserve the right
to water for its citizens . . . .”).
153. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1), http://www.info.gov.za/documents/consti
tution/1996/a108-96.pdf.
154. See id. § 27(2) (“The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of each of these rights.”); supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text (discussing
progressive realization stipulations in the Constitutions of Ecuador, Uganda,
and Zambia similar to Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant).
155. See Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 6 para. 10–11 (discussing impoverished
conditions in Phiri and the serious degree of corrosion permitted to occur in its
water piping between the 1940s and the 1980s).
156. See id. at 4 para. 6, 46 para. 91 (stating that the City of Johannesburg
introduced its Free Basic Water policy in 2001). The Free Basic Water policy
was written to comply with national regulations on the minimum amount of
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infrastructure, illegal connections, and unpaid use in excess of
the six kiloliter limit, Johannesburg Water distributed about one
third of its water supply to Soweto, but only generated one
percent of its revenue from Soweto.157
To address the problem of water sustainability, the City
implemented a new approach in 2004 in Phiri.158 The City
continued to deliver “free basic water” to every household in
Phiri, with additional water delivered only when paid for in
advance through newly installed prepaid meters.159 Many Phiri
households consumed their entire six kiloliters of free basic water
within the first two weeks of the month.160 Phiri residents filed a
lawsuit against the City of Johannesburg, claiming that the

water necessary to satisfy South Africa’s constitutional guarantee of a right to
water. Id. at 9–11 paras. 19–23. However, the six kiloliter limit applied to each
water connection; because these connections often served multi-household lots
with multiple residents in each household, the end supply of water to each
individual resident of a lot was “woefully inadequate.” Jackie Dugard, Civic
Action and Legal Mobilisation: The Phiri Water Meters Case, in MOBILISING
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM RESEARCHERS AND
PRACTITIONERS 71, 73 n.4 (Jeff Handmaker & Remko Berkhout eds., 2010).
157. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras.
11–12, 179 (S. Afr.) (noting that “the rate of payment of municipal bills was less
than 10%”); COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE
IN PHIRI, SOWETO 6 (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf (listing
illegal water connections as a major contributing factor to Johannesburg
Water’s decision to seek new methods for water distribution in poor South
African townships like Phiri).
158. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 8 para. 15 (S. Afr.).
159. See id. at 7–8 paras. 13–14 (describing the rationale and
implementation of “Operation Gcin’amanzi,” which means “to save water”).
Johannesburg Water, acting with the City’s permission, abandoned its previous
deemed consumption flat rate charge system because of rampant payment. See
id. at 78 para. 139 (stating that the rate of payment for municipal bills under
the flat rate system was less than ten percent). Other areas of the City
continued to operate under the old flat rate system, or systems, which allowed
for water to be purchased on credit. See id. at 13 para. 26 (recounting the trial
court’s finding that the prepaid meter system was discriminatory because
Soweto residents were not given the option of installing the kinds of credit
meters that were available to white residents throughout Johannesburg).
160. See, e.g., Founding Affidavit of Lindiwe Mazibuko ¶ 101, Mazibuko v.
City of Johannesburg 2008 (4) All SA 471 (S. Afr.), http://www.wits.
ac.za/files/resdac0c995c698402abd0ce5633a7fe9ff.pdf (complaining that the
allocated supply has never lasted for an entire month since the prepaid meter
was installed in 2004).
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City’s Free Basic Water policy and the decision to install prepaid
water meters were unconstitutional.161
The trial court found in favor of the residents of Phiri,
holding that the Free Basic Water policy and the prepaid water
meter installation violated Section 27 of the South African
Constitution, and it ordered that fifty liters per day be
established as the new free basic water supply.162 On appeal, the
appellate court lowered the minimum free basic water supply to
forty-two liters per person per day.163 The City then appealed to
South Africa’s Constitutional Court.164 The Constitutional Court
reversed the lower court rulings and upheld the prepaid water
meter installation program and the minimum water amounts
established by the City’s Free Basic Water policy.165 The
Constitutional Court deferred to the expertise of agencies in
establishing the minimum amount of water as a reasonable
determination, and held that such technical determinations are
not within the role of the judiciary.166 The Constitutional Court
stated that courts are “ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where
Court orders could have multiple social and economic
consequences for the community.”167 The Mazibuko case
illustrates three fundamental challenges of a provision right to

161. See Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 4 para. 6 (listing the major legal issues
presented by Mazibuko). Mazibuko sought a court declaration that the state
provide at least fifty liters per person per day in order to comply with Section 27
of the South African Constitution. Id. at 13 para. 26.
162. See id. at 13–14 paras. 26–27 (summarizing the trial court’s findings).
163. See id. at 14–15 para. 28 (stating that the appellate court affirmed the
trial court findings of unconstitutionality for the Free Basic Water policy and
the prepaid water meter installation).
164. Id. at 16 para. 30.
165. Id. at 5 para. 9.
166. See id. at 30 para. 61 (suggesting instead that such decisions should be
made by the executive or the legislature).
167. Id. at 27 para. 55 (citation omitted).
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water: (1) enforceability;168 (2) economic sustainability;169 and
(3) ecologic sustainability.170
A. The Provision Right to Water and Enforceability
The Mazibuko case is an example of the limits of enforcing
provision rights.171 There are serious economic and political forces
limiting the capacity of courts to effectively enforce provision
rights.172 Evidence suggests that these obstacles are not unique to
the Mazibuko case but that such obstacles are common and
difficult to overcome wherever and whenever parties seek judicial
enforcement of provision rights.173
In upholding the City’s prepaid meter program, the
Constitutional Court noted that, like provision rights in most
contexts, South Africa’s constitution guaranteed only the
“progressive realization” of a right to water.174 The Constitutional
168. See id. at 28 para. 57 (describing the difficulty of enforcing a claim
based on a positive obligation delineated in the South African Constitution).
169. See id. at 55 para. 110 (justifying the decision that installing prepaid
water meters was constitutional by finding that the meters helped foster
economically sustainable provision of basic services as required by Section
152(1)(b) of the South African Constitution).
170. See id. at 74 para. 139 (decrying the amount of water wasted by the
aging infrastructure and the unsustainable deemed consumption system that
predated Operation Gcin’amanzi).
171. See McGraw, supra note 98, at 198–99 (arguing that the Mazibuko
Court intentionally limited its own powers to realize and enforce positive socioeconomic rights).
172. See Cross, supra note 11, at 882–88 (stating that “the economics of
rights enforcement undermines the effectiveness of any positive right” and that
“[c]ourts . . . avoid involving themselves in matters fundamental to the
enforcement of positive rights” because of political pressure). Cross is
pessimistic about the enforceability of provision rights because of the obstacles
litigation costs pose to the poor, who are most likely to assert positive human
rights. Id. at 880–81. He is also concerned about the political opposition to
courts “running everything,” which leads to strict legislative and executive
checks against judicial enforcement of provision rights. Id. at 887–88 (citation
omitted).
173. See id. at 893–95 (citing empirical data demonstrating the courts have
not typically been very active in enforcing provision rights); Hershkoff, supra
note 95, at 1135 n.10 (referencing the familiar difficulties with judicial
enforcement of affirmative duties).
174. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 19–20 para. 40
(S. Afr.). The court cites Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant for the proposition
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Court held that the City was required only to take reasonable
steps to progressively realize the interests in water guaranteed
under South Africa’s constitution175 and that the constitution
does not create “a self-standing and independent positive right
enforceable irrespective” of available resources.176 Because
provision rights are necessarily constrained in their realization
by the ability of governments to take “appropriate and effective
action,” governmental delays in realizing a provision right are
easily explained, and that explanation is not easily challenged.177
The common conditioning of provision rights on progressive
realization and available resources makes such rights effectively
unenforceable by the judiciary.178
The problem of “progressive realization” is also an obstacle to
enforcement of a provision right to water under international
law.179 As already noted, to the extent a provision right exists
under international law, such a right must be inferred from other
express rights under the ESC Covenant.180 Article 11 of the ESC
Covenant recognizes a right to “an adequate standard of living,”
which implies a right to water, as noted by the U.N. in General
Comment 15.181 The ESC Covenant, however, requires only that
states “take steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the [ESC Covenant].”182
that the “progressive realization” formulation of positive obligations “applies to
most of the social and economic rights entrenched in our Constitution and is
consistent with the principles of international law.” Id.
175. See id. at 36 para. 74 (discussing whether the City took the reasonable
steps necessary to satisfy the progressive realization standard in Section 27(2)
of the South African Constitution and concluding that the city was not
unreasonable in its actions).
176. Id. at 25 para. 49 (citation omitted).
177. Cross, supra note 11, at 876–77. Of course, the “progressive realization”
condition could simply be removed, but then courts are left imposing obligations
on the state which the state may be unable to meet immediately, because those
obligations require installation of costly and complex infrastructure.
178. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 633, 668 (1991) (noting the existence of provision rights in India’s
constitution, but concluding that such rights are not judicially enforceable).
179. Infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
180. Supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
181. Supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
182. ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 49.
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Just as in the Mazibuko example, any claims of a right to water
implied by the ESC Covenant have the inherent weakness of not
being immediately binding upon states, given the latitude of the
language of the covenant for states to tailor compliance with
covenant obligations to resource availability and progressive
realization.183
The nature of the judiciary is also a limitation on
enforceability of a provision right to water.184 The Constitutional
Court in Mazibuko upheld the City’s established amount and
reversed the lower court rulings based on what the Constitutional
Court called “an understanding of the proper role of courts in our
constitutional democracy.”185 The Constitutional Court stated
that
[i]t is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and
economic right entails and what steps government should take
to ensure the progressive realization of the right. This is a
matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the
institutions of government best placed to investigate social
conditions in the light of available budgets and to determine
what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic
rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic
accountability that they should do so for it is their programs
and promises that are subjected to democratic popular
choice.186

The different opinions of what constitutes “sufficient water”
of the three courts involved in adjudicating Mazibuko suggests

183. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 20 para. 40
n.31 (S. Afr.) (discussing the slow-developing nature of the progressive
realization concept outlined in Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant); Lisa J.
Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and
the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 149 (2007)
(confirming that Article 2(1) “make[s] [other ESC Covenant] provisions not
immediately binding”).
184. Infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
185. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 28 para. 57. In summarizing Lawrence
Sager’s similar conclusions relating to the positive human right to health care,
Frank Cross noted that “[g]iven these complexities, it is unclear that the
judiciary is the best branch for making wise decisions about positive rights, even
when acting sincerely.” Cross, supra note 11, at 905.
186. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 30 para. 61.
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that courts often are not well equipped for making the kind of
technical determinations required in water management.187
Executive agencies or legislatures could take two different
approaches to more effectively guide judicial enforcement of
provision rights, each equally problematic. The first would be to
establish a broad, guiding principle in the formulation of the
right and allow courts to enforce that principle on a case-by-case
basis—for example, a simple guarantee of “sufficient water.”
However, such ambiguity raises serious challenges in terms of
enforcement.188 Where courts lack information and expertise
relative to government budgets and revenue, the judicial
enforcement of provision rights requiring government
expenditures can create serious fiscal problems.189 Where courts
lack information and expertise regarding local conditions,
including population density, consumption patterns, and
demographics, judicial enforcement of provision rights may prove
inadequate or overreaching.190
To avoid such indeterminacy, legislatures may take a second
approach by quantifying the amount and quality of water
187. See Cross, supra note 11, at 902 (suggesting that, when confronted with
the opportunity, judges will simply use “positive rights to advance their
ideological policy preferences” rather than making pragmatic, policy-oriented
decisions). Mark Tushnet notes that a “judge is rather more likely to pick the
theory that points where he or she wants to go anyway, than to pick a theory
and reluctantly find that it leads to conclusions he or she would have preferred
to avoid.” MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
155 (1999). Cross points out that empirically establishing the prevalence of
ideological or political judicial decision-making is difficult, given that “[m]ost
judges would sooner admit to grand larceny than confess a political interest or
motivation.” Cross, supra note 11, at 906 (quoting ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD
STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 264 (1990) (quoting DONALD DALE
JACKSON, JUDGES 18 (1974))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (“While all language is somewhat
ambiguous, positive rights . . . suffer from particular indeterminacy. The reason
for this indeterminacy is that such rights are consequentialist, requiring the
judiciary to create a program that achieves a given result.”).
189. See PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER,
FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 126 (1987) (arguing that if
courts were to enforce provision rights, they would become embroiled in the
same budgetary and tax debates that the concept of judicial review was
designed to avoid in the first place).
190. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (arguing that, when faced with
“imperfect information” about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very
little to promote the ends commanded by [provision] rights”).
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required to meet a provision right. As noted above, the City of
Johannesburg, South Africa, attempted such an approach by
establishing the six kiloliters per month per household
standard.191 This standard, however, proved unworkable,
partially because the government did not understand that
households were much larger in Phiri than in other townships in
the City.192 As such, in order to avoid the challenge of
indeterminacy in judicial enforcement, codification of the
provision right to water often forces a rigid legal establishment of
minimum standards. Such rigid standards may not prove
workable as conditions differ both temporally and spatially. To
the extent that courts evaluate these minimum standards, they
are left making ad hoc determinations of the viability of these
minimum standards under different localized conditions.193 As
with fleshing out vague and indeterminate guarantees of
“sufficient” water, courts are often left making technical
determinations for which they are ill-suited even when a
minimum standard is established.194
Establishing causation also poses an obstacle to judicial
enforcement of a provision right to water. Droughts, floods, and
waterborne epidemics impact human rights but are not
necessarily human rights violations.195 The difficulty of
establishing the government as the “cause,” and therefore the
191. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text (explaining how the
City continued to offer a minimum supply of six kiloliters in Phiri and
implemented a meter system for additional water).
192. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting how quickly Phiri
households consumed the water provided by the government).
193. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that the South
African Constitutional Court has previously expressed the difficulties associated
with deciding cases that have broad social and economic consequences); Cross,
supra note 11, at 903–05 (illustrating the complexities associated with judicial
enforcement of positive rights such as “a minimal level of subsistence”).
194. See Christine A. Klein & Ling-Yee Huang, Cultural Norms as a Source
of Law: The Example of Bottled Water, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 535 (2008)
(arguing that state legislatures in the United States have failed to adequately
update the “law governing the initial appropriation of water resources” and that
courts deciding cases concerning bottled water “necessarily produc[e] reactive
and fact-specific decisions, rather than comprehensive legislative guidance”).
195. See Bodanksy, supra note 80, at 519 (“Human rights are ‘human’ by
virtue of not only their victims but also their perpetrators. And they represent
human rights ‘violations’ only if there is some identifiable duty that some
identifiable duty-holder has breached.”).
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liable party, of a failure to adequately provide sufficient water,
when water availability is influenced by global climate patterns
and other factors outside of any government’s control,196 limits
the enforceability of a provision right to water.197 While droughts,
floods, or epidemics are often partially attributable to a failure of
governance, courts are nevertheless incapable of evaluating
where a natural disaster ends and governance failure begins in
assessing causation,198 and thus enforcing a provision right to
water.
As already noted, courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate and
enforce a provision right to water, as typically formulated.199
Similarly, those citizens most likely to bring an action to enforce
a provision right to water—the economically or socially
disenfranchised—typically lack the means to effectively assert
that right.200 Enforcement of rights requires resources just as
196. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington
Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 383–89 (2008)
(explaining that “vastly altered precipitation patterns” resulting from global
climate change affect the “total availability of water”).
197. Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights
Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934 (2007)
It would be impossible for a victim of global warming to show that one
particular corporation or factory caused his injury. Any theory would
need to allocate liability on the basis of market share of some other
proxy for degree of responsibility, and although American courts
sometimes do this, the difficulties of using such theories for global
warming are considerable. Id.
198. See id. (noting that a victim of global warming would have to rely on a
“theory . . . allocat[ing] liability on the basis of . . . [a] proxy for degree of
responsibility, and although American courts sometimes do this, the difficulties
of using such theories for global warming are considerable” (citation omitted));
Mark Pelling, Disaster Risk and Development Planning: The Case for
Integration, INT’L DEV. PLANNING REV., Dec. 2003, at i–ix (discussing the
challenges of assessing how governmental failures during the development
planning phase expose areas to heightened risk in the event of natural
disasters).
199. Supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text. The political ideology of
judges can also skew outcomes in some judicial systems, either against
conservation measures like water pricing or against efforts to improve
distribution equity, including water subsidies. See supra note 187 and
accompanying text (describing the possible correlation between political ideology
and judicial decision making).
200. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 5 (1991) (introducing
the general assertion that those in poverty often “lack the necessary disposable
income to pay for attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and other costs associated
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much as the realization of rights. A provision right must be
developed and implemented, often through litigation.201 When the
parties most interested in the provision right lack resources to
litigate, or when “opposing groups with greater resources can
engage in strategic litigation and settlement to avoid significant
precedents,” such a right is unlikely to be fully realized.202
The challenge of judicial enforcement of a provision right to
water is all the more complicated under international law. In
addition to the problems of indeterminacy, progressive
realization, and limited resources, international law typically
only applies to disputes between states.203 As noted above, to the
extent a provision right to water exists under international law,
it must be inferred from other express provision rights under the
ESC Covenant.204 However, unlike the CP Covenant, the ESC
Covenant’s Optional Protocol is not yet binding, as an insufficient
number of states have acceded to the Optional Protocol.205 Given
with participation in the judicial process”). But see Mark A. Graber, The
Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional
Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 787 (1997) (noting that “organizers of poor people’s
movements believe that the litigation campaigns of the 1960s helped numerous
people receive aid or improved benefits”).
201. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880 (“Rights do not enforce themselves.
They require judicial decisions interpreting and enforcing their terms. Those
decisions in turn require that a case or controversy come before the courts.”).
202. Id. at 881–83. There are ways to ameliorate this problem, such as
attorney’s fee provision requirements and public service attorneys. See, e.g.,
Allen K. Yu, Enhancing Legal Aid Access Through an Open Source Commons
Model, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 373, 384–85 (2007) (advocating for a virtual “legal
aid commons” through which public service practitioners could pool resources to
more efficiently serve indigent clients).
203. See JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28–71 (2d ed.
2010) (outlining various mechanisms created by the United Nations for the
protection of human rights, and noting the limited circumstances where claims
can be brought before international tribunals by non-state parties).
204. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at Art. 11 (“The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family . . . and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions.”); General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 8 (discussing states’
obligations to “ensure that natural water resources are protected from
contamination”).
205. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 50–51 (stating that parties to the
ESC Covenant “recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living . . . including adequate food,” but not expressly stating that parties
recognize a right to water); General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 3 (asserting
that the ESC Covenant provides a right to water because the right “clearly falls
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the lack of a binding Optional Protocol, the ESC Covenant lacks
adjudicative processes and enforcement mechanisms, making it
“normatively and jurisprudentially underdeveloped compared to
the [CP Covenant].”206
Courts are limited in their capacity to enforce provision
rights because the typical formulation of such rights raises the
challenges of indeterminacy or rigidity,207 establishing
causation,208 and satisfying the condition of “progressive
realization.”209 Just because adequate and affordable water for all
is an indisputable “good” does not mean that a judicially
enforceable right to such water is also “good.” This is because the
right to water is bound to the ability of the government to provide
that good sustainably and effectively and the capacity of citizens
to police and enforce that right.210
B. The Provision Right to Water and Economic Sustainability
In addition to problems of enforceability, which are typical of
provision rights in general, the provision right to water raises
challenges of economic sustainability. Water is different than the
objects of other provision rights regimes because treating water
as an economic commodity has always been problematic. Adam
Smith famously wrote of the “water–diamond paradox,” noting
that water has a high use value but low exchange value, whereas
a diamond has a low use value but high exchange value.211 The
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of
living” and is “inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable
standard of health”).
206. SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY
163 (2d ed. 2004); see also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol to the CP Covenant].
207. Supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text.
208. Supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
209. Supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
210. See Cross, supra note 11, at 877 (arguing that “effective rights
enforcement requires plaintiffs with ability and resources”).
211. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 28 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library ed. 1965) (1776). Plato
framed the issued somewhat differently. See PLATO, Euthydemus, in, PLATO:
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water–diamond paradox illustrates the difficulty of effectively
valuing a resource of infinite use value, but limited exchange
value.212 The price of water, influenced by actual or perceived
notions of scarcity, does not accurately reflect the true value of
water.213 Water is thus undervalued because consumers
inaccurately perceive it has low production costs and greater
supply than demand. This public perception influences political
actors who set low water rates for water utilities, which are

COMPLETE WORKS 708, 743 (John M. Cooper ed., Rosamond Kent Sprague trans.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1997) (“For it is the rare thing . . . which is the precious one,
and water is cheapest, even thoughg . . . it is the best.” (citation omitted)). For a
modern critique of the classic framing of the concept, see Michael V. White,
Doctoring Adam Smith: The Fable of the Diamonds and Water Paradox, 34 HIST.
POL. ECON. 659 (2002), arguing that Smith’s failure to employ a marginal utility
analysis prevented him from solving the “paradox.”
212. See W.M. Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in WATER
CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? MARCELINO BOTIN WATER FORUM 2004, at 61 (Peter P.
Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (analyzing different economic approaches to the
valuation of water in light of its distinct features as an economic commodity).
Water is unique as an economic commodity for reasons other than its relatively
low exchange value compared to its use value. Water has unique spiritual and
cultural meaning, which makes it less easily analyzed in accordance with the
“rational actor” of classical economics. See VERONICA STRANG, THE MEANING OF
WATER 213 (2004) (“The most central themes of meaning—water as the essence
of life, as the substance of social and spiritual being, as a matter of life and
death—are clearly integral to assessments of its quality.”). Water is unevenly
distributed across time and space, sometimes far from population centers, and
the climatic influence on its variability unpredictable, particularly with global
climate change. See Hanemann, supra, at 72–74 (explaining how water’s
“mobility” and “variability” complicate the matching of supply and demand). As
of 2004, “six countries—Brazil, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, China, and
Columbia—account for half of the world’s total renewable supply of freshwater.”
Id. at 73 (citation omitted). In California, two-thirds of the state’s population
lives in the south, which receives less than 10% of the state’s total precipitation,
and 80% of that precipitation occurs between October and March, while three
quarters of the water use occurs between April and September. Id. (citation
omitted). This makes water transport and planning costly, and water provision
and pricing as inherently “unequal” as its distribution, with variability and
distance from population requiring costly infrastructure projects for storage and
transportation, not to mention treatment. See id. at 74–76 (describing the
challenges associated with transporting and sanitizing water). Water is also
both a private good (for example, bottled water) and a public good (for example,
in situ water uses like fishing or swimming). Id. at 70–72.
213. See Hanemann, supra note 212, at 76 (explaining how “the prices which
most users pay for water reflect, at best, its physical supply cost and not its
scarcity value”).

2222

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013)

regulated as natural monopolies.214 The unique challenge of
pricing water and recovery costs of water treatment and delivery
can be aggravated by a provision right to water.
This aggravation results because the provision right to water
is typically formulated in a way that either ignores, or is hostile
to, the idea of water as a valuable commodity requiring expensive
infrastructure to fully develop.215 For example, some have argued
that the full cost recovery and water pricing is inconsistent with
the idea of a right to water.216 They argue that “[i]nstead of
commodifying water even further, we need to recover it by
treating it as part of the commons and by strengthening
community participation in water management.”217
Such a formulation of the provision right to water is
counterproductive for three primary reasons. First, many
countries are reluctant to recognize any right to water because
they are concerned that a “[provision right] to water may mean
free provision of clean water . . . which they simply cannot afford”
without recovering costs from consumers.218 As such,
214. See id. at 77–78 (asserting that there is a tendency to underprice water
in the United States because after a major water system is put in place “water
agencies are often politically locked into a regime of low water prices focused
narrowly on the recovery of the historical cost of construction”).
215. See The Dublin Statement, supra note 142, at 4 (noting inefficient use
of water and pointing out that the resource “has an economic value in all its
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good”). “[I]t is vital to
recognize . . . the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water
and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic
value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the
resource.” Id.
216. See Bluemel, supra note 30, at 963–65 (explaining how “[t]reating
water as an economic good without limitation as is done under the principle of
full cost recovery can lead to inequities”).
217. MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 210 (2002); see also SHIVA, supra note
64, at ix–x (classifying a contemporary “clash of . . . two water cultures” as
between “a culture that sees water as sacred and treats its provision as a duty
for the preservation of life and another that sees water as a commodity, and its
ownership and trade as fundamental corporate rights”). Shiva contends: “The
culture of commodification is at war with diverse cultures of sharing, of
receiving and giving water as a free gift.” Id. at x.
218. Asit K. Biswas, Water as a Human Right in the MENA Region:
Challenges and Opportunities, 23 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 209, 215
(2007) (“Since [a provision right to water] simply cannot be achieved within the
foreseeable future, these countries prefer not to recognize this concept until
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formulations of a provision right to water hostile to cost recovery
and appropriate pricing often discourage states from applying a
rights framework to their water policy because they are
understandably reluctant to assume obligations that they are
unable to meet.219
Second, where a provision right to water requires piped
delivery to the point of use of high-quality-treated water at low or
no cost, lack of cost recovery results in degraded treatment and
delivery infrastructure and, ultimately, inadequate delivery of
poor-quality water.220 There is a relationship between the
“economic sustainability” of water provision, including consistent
delivery and water quality, and the “recovery of costs through . . .
[consumer] tariffs that are equitably assigned based on ability-topay.”221 The challenges faced by India, Bolivia, and South Africa
discussed above each illustrate how a provision rights approach
to water may lead to a failure to properly price water and fully
recover costs and ultimately undermine the rationales behind a
right to water.
Third, where the provision right to water precludes or
discourages cost recovery and water pricing, it also discourages
needed investment in water infrastructure.222 The capital
their responsibilities and accountabilities are clarified, as well as those of the
consumers.”).
219. See Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big
Responsibilities: Financial and Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water
for Developing Countries, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 685 (2009)
(observing that many countries party to the ESC Covenant “simply do not have
the financial and capacity-related resources to implement the items identified as
core obligations in relation to the right to water”); Biswas, supra note 218, at
215 (stating that some countries disfavor recognizing a provision right to water
because they are “unsure of the legal implications if they approve the overall
philosophy”).
220. Cf. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water 18 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 94, 115 (2006) (“[T]he fact that the very poor do pay for water,
and pay quite a bit in relative terms, suggested that they both can and will pay
for piped water. Thus the principle of ‘full cost recovery’—charging a price to
cover costs and profit—has seemed both possible and desirable.” (citation
omitted)).
221. Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future of Water Services, 20 FLA.
J. INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 179, 195–96 (2008).
222. In 2000 the United Nations adopted its “Millennium Development
Goals” (MDGs), which included the goal “to halve, by the year 2015, . . . the
proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.”
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investment needed for adequate water and sanitation
infrastructure over the next twenty years exceeds $100 billion per
year, with regions in the most need least able to absorb those
costs.223 Much of the growing challenge of global water stress can
be attributed to a dramatic shortfall in necessary capital to fund
improvements in water infrastructure.224 It is simply not possible
to meaningfully implement a right to water without dramatic
increases in capital expenditures in water infrastructure.225 Such
United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). In tandem with these “lofty expectations,” the ESC
Covenant “places at minimum a moral responsibility on wealthy nations and
international financial institutions for seeing that [the MDGs] are fulfilled.”
McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 685. Framing the solution in such a
manner may have left some countries in an untenable position: they were
discouraged from investing on their own and now are unable to rely on
wealthier nations as the ESC Covenant originally envisioned given “today’s
economic and financial climate.” See id. (describing how the high demands of the
MDGs and the ESC Covenant have put significant pressure on state parties).
223. See Salzman, supra note 220, at 115 (observing in 2006 that the capital
investment needed for water and sanitation infrastructure approached $100
billion per year over the next twenty-five years and that “the weak financial
resources of developing country governments prevent them from absorbing the
costs of water provision upgrades” (citation omitted)).
224. See Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing
Countries via Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91,
94–95 (1995) (explaining how “[t]raditional sources of funding for [water]
infrastructure have not met the critical needs of developing countries”);
CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 1 (asserting that water must be treated as
an economic good and investment sources tapped more efficiently to tackle
funding deficits). Investments of at least $100 billion annually would have been
required to achieve the MDGs when they were originally proposed. See id.
(noting that the World Water Council in 2000 presented a report suggesting
that meeting water goals required “additional annual investments of about $100
billion”). Africa has 38% of its population unserved by safe water, Asia has 19%
(52% without access to sanitation services), and Latin America and the
Caribbean have 15% without access to safe water (22% without sanitation
services). Id. at 5. The western United States and Ethiopia have roughly similar
climates and hydrologic conditions, yet because of investment in infrastructure,
the western United States has 5,000 cubic meters worth of water storage per
person, while Ethiopia has only 50 cubic meters. Id. In 2003, the annual
shortfall of needed capital was estimated to be between $10 and $32 billion,
with population growth in developing countries far outstripping efforts to make
up lost ground. See id. at 3 (noting that, depending on the standards used, the
extra investment required is $10 billion on the low end and $17 to $32 billion on
the high end (citation omitted)).
225. See Meera Mehta, Thomas Fugelsnes & Kameel Virjee, Financing the
Millennium Development Goals for Water and Sanitation: What Will It Take?, 21
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 239 (2005) (examining whether African
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dramatic increases will not come unless there is support for
effective water pricing and full cost recovery.226
Where the right to water is framed as a right to water “free of
economic encumbrances,”227 such a right is counterproductive to
the development and expansion of affordable clean water supplies
for all. The challenge presented in formulating a right to water is
to meet the purpose of such a right—protecting the
disadvantaged—while at the same time ensuring that water
provision is economically sustainable by treating water as a
valuable and often scarce resource.228 The recent World Water
Commission strongly advocated for full cost pricing of water
services, noting that “the single most immediate and important
measure that we can recommend is the systematic adoption of
full cost pricing for water services.”229 The concern, however, is
the impact full cost pricing of water will have on the poor in
developing countries.230
countries can meet the MDGs given “large funding gaps”). See Briscoe, supra
note 37, at 459, for an examination of different water infrastructure financing
mechanisms.
226. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 13 (“Sustainable financing for
water systems will require greatly improved cost recovery from their users and
increased management efficiency.”); Mehta et al., supra note 225, at 239–40
(arguing that African countries “will need to implement cost recovery policies” in
attempting to reach the MDGs). Water infrastructure is uniquely capital
intensive. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. In the United States, “the
ratio of capital investment to revenue is twice as high in water as in natural
gas, and 70% higher than electricity and telecommunications.” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
227. See, e.g., Hardberger, supra note 143, at 349 (describing the “basic
premise” of General Comment 15 as providing an unqualified right to water);
BARLOW, supra note 93, at 168 (asserting that General Comment 15 is “an
authoritative interpretation that water is a right”).
228. See Savenije & van der Zaag, supra note 49, at 98–104 (arguing that
water pricing should serve the purpose of financial sustainability through cost
recovery with equity considerations achieved through increasing block tariffs).
229. WORLD WATER COMM., A WATER SECURE WORLD 33 (2000); see also Peter
Rogers, Radhika de Silva & Ramesh Bhatia, Water is an Economic Good: How to
Use Prices to Promote Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1,
1–17 (2002) (“We argue in this paper that the conventional wisdom is
incorrect—increasing prices can improve equity. Higher water rates allow
utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently
forced to purchase water from vendors at very high prices.”).
230. See Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water,
21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 109–10 (2010) (observing that some developing
countries fear that expanded privatization of water infrastructure with the aid
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The poor in developing countries often pay up to twenty-five
times more for water from private water vendors than those who
have access to a regular tap supply.231 The charges imposed by
water vendors are not only evidence of the inequity resulting
from certain water policies but are also evidence that expanding
access to tapped and treated water can reduce expenditures on
water by the poor. However, such expansion requires investment
in infrastructure. When infrastructure for delivery and treatment
go unfunded because of a failure to generate revenue and recover
costs, water delivery becomes inconsistent, water quality
decreases, and the poor suffer most.232 An effective cost-recovery
mechanism encourages capital investments and facilitates
lending for start-up costs on water treatment and distribution
infrastructure by protecting lenders’ expectations of repayment
and investors’ returns, and ensures sufficient revenues for
maintenance and improvements. Where a provision right to
water is framed in such a way as to interfere with full cost
recovery and appropriate water pricing, the right is
counterproductive to its presumed end of protecting the
economically disadvantaged.
Two counterarguments could be laid against policies directed
at full cost recovery and water pricing. The first is that large
general governmental subsidies allow for payment of water
services and infrastructure maintenance and upgrades without
requiring consumers to pay water tariffs. An alternative
of foreign corporations would subject the “poor . . . [to] the adverse impact of
high prices and service cut-offs” (citation omitted)).
231. ROUSE, supra note 71, at 16, 47; see also Sudhirendar Sharma,
Watermarkets Exclude the Poor, in THE VALUE OF NATURE: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS
IN INDIA 141, 145 (Smitu Kothari, Imtiaz Ahmad & Helmut Reifeld eds., 2003)
(“World Bank sponsored studies indicate that urban poor already pay five times
the municipal rate for water in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; 25 times more in Dhaka,
Bangladesh; and 40 times more in Cairo, Egypt.”).
232. See ARTHUR C. MCINTOSH, ASIAN WATER SUPPLIES: REACHING THE URBAN
POOR 35 (2003) (“Water and poverty are linked by private operators with
concessions promising to bring investment funds to the table to improve
coverage, which they have not done, and water and poverty are linked by the
poor suffering as a consequence.” (emphasis in original)). One of the proposed
strategies to combat such problems is to “[d]evelop mechanisms for cost recovery
that provide appropriate incentives to achieve stated policy objectives: for
example, with regard to subsidy and financial performance.” Id. at 69 (emphasis
omitted).
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approach to privatization of water services and infrastructure to
achieve effective cost recovery is public financing of water
infrastructure and services through taxation. Advocacy for the
provision right to water is often coupled with arguments in favor
of large general water subsidies as a means of ensuring expanded
access and maintenance of water infrastructure to poor
communities and avoiding rate increases often associated with a
private water sector.233 General water subsidies in developing
countries are “motivated predominantly by social objectives,”
including ensuring water provision to the poor, under the
assumption that the poor cannot afford to pay for piped, treated
water.234
Currently, cost recovery of drinking water services in
developing countries is about 35% on average, with water prices
“set at a fraction of the marginal costs of supply.”235 The fiscal
burden of underpricing water in developing countries can be
conservatively estimated at $13 billion per annum, with total
subsidies for drinking water in developing countries reaching in
excess of $45 billion per year.236 As already noted above,
empirical evidence on the price paid by the poor to water vendors
suggests that the poor would be better able to afford effectively
priced tapped water than prices they often pay to vendors in
areas where publicly financed water provision is absent,
unreliable, or unsafe.237
233. See Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change
and Water, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 489, 496–99 (2010) (advocating for
continued public participation in water management, including “sensible
subsidies” (citation omitted)); Jennifer Naegele, What Is Wrong with FullFledged Water Privatization?, 6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 100–01 (2004)
(arguing for public management of water systems and asserting that after
privatization, “[p]oor and rural communities are often left in a worse position
than before privatization because they can no longer afford the sharply
increased rates and are sometimes cut off from service altogether”).
234. André de Moor & Cees van Beers, The Perversity of Government
Subsidies for Energy and Water, in GREENING THE BUDGET: BUDGETARY POLICIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 24, 32–38 (J. Peter Clinch et al. eds., 2002).
235. Id. at 36.
236. Id. at 36–37.
237. See id. at 39 (concluding that “[r]eforming current water-pricing
practices will . . . generate the necessary resources to expand public water
services, while governments and banking institutions could then provide credit
facilities to low-income groups to safeguard an easy access to public drinking
water”); ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47–49 (offering various approaches to
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The challenge for a publicly financed, general subsidy
approach to water provision is that regulators subject to political
pressure set water rates.238 As such, regulators keep rates low, if
charged or collected at all, with the water sector receiving large
general subsidies to offset lack of cost recovery.239 As will be
discussed in more detail below, large general subsidies and low
rates and collection result in significant waste of water resources
because there is no incentive for conservation.240 Furthermore,
public financing of the water sector has demonstrated costs
associated with waste and inefficiency. Furthermore, general
subsidies for drinking water favor the rich, as the rich are more
typically connected to public water systems.241
Additionally, general subsidies interfere with integrated
water resource management (IWRM). IWRM is a process
requiring coordinated development and management of water
across different sectors and their various uses of water to
“equitably maximize economic and social welfare without
compromising sustainability and environmental quality.”242
improving the valuation of water so as to assist the poor).
238. See Darwin C. Hall, Public Choice and Water Rate Design, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER PRICING REFORMS 189, 189–212 (Ariel Dinar ed.
2000) (discussing how the Los Angeles Blue Ribbon Committee on Water Rates,
appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley in the early 1990s after an extended drought,
evaluated various models and policy choices for setting water rates).
239. See Ariel Dinar, Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER PRICING REFORMS 1, 7 (Ariel Dinar ed. 2000)
(noting that “[p]ricing reforms are often complicated by financial crises and low
cost recovery of the investment in the water system” and that governments
must thus “subsidize the budgets of the irrigation departments”).
240. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 24–25 (noting that the United States
has reduced water subsidies in an effort to improve water valuation and other
nations have sought to “to charge urban residents the full cost of delivered
water”). See generally NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES:
HOW TAX DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY (Island
Press 2001) (1997) (exploring the ill effects of certain subsidies on various
sectors, including water); Glennon, supra note 40, at 1882–84 (advocating for
the elimination of general subsidies in the United States water sector to “gain
people’s attention about their water use through their pocketbooks” and noting
that general water subsidies lead to the price of water being “ridiculously low”).
241. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47 (“Most commonly, there are general
subsidies which give most benefit to the ‘rich’, but which are generally
insufficient for sustainability, with the result that the service declines and the
necessary extensions to distribution systems to serve the poor are not funded.”).
242. GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, TAC BACKGROUND PAPERS NO. 4:
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IWRM is broadly recognized as the prevailing paradigm for water
governance and management.243 Effective IWRM requires that
water revenues and expenditures be integrated in order to
monitor nonrevenue water resulting from illegal connections or
leaks, and to evaluate water utility performance.244 General
subsidies, along with ineffective water pricing and failure to
achieve full cost recovery, “hamper expanding and improving the
public water system because water companies lack the necessary
financial resources to do so.”245
The second argument against policies favoring full cost
recovery and water pricing is based on concerns about the risks
associated with privatization of water resources. Concerns over
cost recovery, pricing, and capital investment in infrastructure
are often conflated with advocacy for water resource and
infrastructure privatization. Privatization of water services,
supply, and infrastructure is a global trend that has created
challenges in many nations, including Bolivia, as illustrated
above.246 Privatization is advocated on the one hand as a way of
facilitating access to capital and technical expertise, promoting
efficiency, reducing costs through competitive bidding, expanding

INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 64 (2000).
243. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated
Water Management: Is the CZMA a Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 212–13
(2012) (discussing the benefits and goals of IWRM).
244. See Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil’s Water Law:
Encouraging Sound Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory
Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 147, 154 (2006) (noting the economic benefits of
having private sector participation in the water sector).
245. De Moor & van Beers, supra note 234, at 38.
246. See Arnold, supra note 114, at 796, 798 (stating that the privatization
of the water supplies and infrastructures is a global trend that is appearing
prominently in developing countries, but has led to intense conflicts over a
variety of issues and faces public opposition in places such as Bolivia); Briscoe,
supra note 38, at 302 (noting that there is a global trend of an increase in
private investment in developing countries’ infrastructures). In 2000, ninetythree countries had municipal water systems that underwent some form of
privatization, as developing countries turned to large corporations for
investments to improve water infrastructure, and as loans from organizations
like the World Bank and regional development banks are conditioned upon
privatization. Violeta Petrova, Note, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold:
Water Privatization and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 577,
577–78 (2006).
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access, and improving quality.247 On the other hand, some argue
that privatization is a dereliction of the government’s public trust
in a shared common resource and unduly burdens the poor as
water rates are raised to ensure debts are repaid and profits
secured.248 Although the merits of privatization are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is important to note that cost recovery and
effective and reasonable pricing of water as a valuable commodity
are not synonymous with privatization.249
C. The Provision Right to Water and Ecologic Sustainability
A provision right to water framed in a manner opposed to
water pricing and cost recovery is not only counterproductive to
its presumed end of protecting disadvantaged communities but it
also poses risks to ecologic sustainability and human health.
Appropriate water pricing encourages sustainable use.250
247. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 700 (“Some see [private
sector] involvement as an efficient way of tapping into capital and technical
expertise, thereby achieving both access and conservation goals, increasing the
network of official water service provision, and increasing the quality and
efficiency of that service.”).
248. See id. at 700–01 (“Others see private sector involvement as a violation
of the right of people to shared, common resource, and as further alienating poor
communities by depriving those without means of the ability to pay for
necessary water resources.”); Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Erin Derrington,
Investment in Water and Wastewater Infrastructure: An Environmental Justice
Challenge, a Governance Solution, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2010, at
3, 4 (noting criticism of water privatization in China where there are claims that
companies are benefiting at the expense of the poor by having high profit
margins).
249. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 701 (noting that the South
African constitution allows for the payment of water services but does not allow
for the denial of basic water access to those that cannot pay, placing a financing
or political burden on the government). Corporatized publicly owned utilities,
effective and transparent regulatory oversight, and public–private partnerships
have the potential to achieve many of the benefits of privatization, including
effective pricing and affordable service to poor communities. See generally
ROUSE, supra note 71.
250. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 18 (arguing that “full cost
recovery from users is the ideal long-term aim”); Priceless, ECONOMIST (July 17,
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1906846 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013)
(noting that the colossal underpricing of water leads to overuse and waste, and
contending that sensible water pricing, reflecting actual costs of treatment and
transport, would correct the challenge of water conservation) (on file with the
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According to a World Bank senior executive, “water pricing is an
essential instrument to enhance the sustainability of the
resource.”251 Free or heavily subsidized water services lead
invariably to waste of water resources with implications for
human health, intergenerational equity, and the environment as
water is withdrawn faster than it is naturally restored.252
There is a growing awareness that large general water
subsidies produce waste that is not ecologically sustainable,
particularly in water-scarce regions, and that general subsidies
for water are harmful in the long run to the environment.253
Large general water subsidies are a major cause of
overdevelopment and environmental degradation in arid
regions.254 In developing countries in particular, general water
subsidies have been linked to severe environmental damage such
as salinity contamination of rivers, land subsidence, and loss of

Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank Backs Privatizing Water, Critics
Dismayed, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003; see also Petrova, supra note 246,
at 587 (quoting the report).
252. See MYERS & KENT, supra note 240, at 123–31 (describing how water
shortages and a lack of clean water in developing countries lead to deaths from
water-related diseases, economic harm because of the time that people take
each day to find water, and environmental damage through the drainage of
wetlands and the depletion of fish stocks); Glennon, supra note 40, at 1883
(encouraging a reform of the present system by eliminating subsidies as a
strategy that “would gain people’s attention about their water use through their
pocketbooks” and noting that water prices are “ridiculously low”).
253. See Peter P. Rogers, Water Governance, Water Security and Water
Sustainability, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 3, 4–10 (Peter P. Rogers et
al. eds., 2006) (discussing water sustainability issues); Jennifer Hoffpauir, The
Environmental Impact of Commodity Subsidies: NEPA and the Farm Bill, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 253–55 (2009) (explaining that the increase in the
amount of land used for farming has led to an increase in soil erosion, requiring
the use of more pesticides and fertilizers that create lasting environmental
impacts).
254. See David L. Feldman & Helen Ingram, Multiple Ways of Knowing
Water Resources: Enhancing the Statutes of Water Ethics, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 1, 7 (2009) (“[M]any ecologists have come to see subsidies provided by
government to various groups of water users as a major cause of
overdevelopment and damage to the environment.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16–
25 (1992) (explaining that, among other things, increased environmental
demands to maintain fisheries and wildlife in the arid West have led to the end
of large subsidized water storage facilities and distribution systems).
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biodiversity.255 Where water in general is underpriced because of
large general subsidies, more water is applied to crops, leading to
erosion, and sediment and salinity contamination of rivers.256
Where drinking water is underpriced because of large general
subsidies, the lack of incentive to avoid wasting water in domestic
uses results in water mining or “overdraft,” where water is
withdrawn faster than it is naturally recharged, with reduced
flow impacting wildlife and nutrient transport and cycling.257
The environmental risk posed by a provision rights-based,
low-cost or freewater policy is mirrored by other risks posed to
public health. General Comment 15, as an example of the
provision rights formulation, raises important questions as to
how public health can be appropriately prioritized in a provision
rights approach.258 For example, does the priority given to
personal and domestic uses include only drinking water, or does
it also include sanitation, the most important way to prevent

255. See Feldman, supra note 254, at 7 (noting that ecologists see water
subsidies as damaging to the environment). This focus on low-cost water
demonstrates another inherent problem of any “human rights” approach to
water policy, but particularly the positive human rights approach’s emphasis on
cheap or free water—its inherent “humanness.” See Leonard Hammer,
Indigenous Peoples as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right to Water, 10
INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 131, 135 (2004) (“Human needs branch out to
many sectors of society, with each at times offsetting the other’s claims and
diminishing the utility of the right.”). The human right to water as
contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt an anthropocentric
model, whereby the environment exists to serve the basic needs of human
beings.” Id. at 134.
256. See T.C. DOUGHERTY & A.W. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
OF IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE PROJECTS 47, 48 (1995) (explaining that irrigation
systems will make the land wetter and less able to absorb rainfall, potentially
leading to more soil erosion and resulting in an increase in the amount of
sediments and salinity in the local rivers).
257. See Sharad K. Jain, Anupma Sharma, & Rakesh Kumar, Freshwater
and Its Management in India, 2 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 259, 263–64 (2004)
(explaining that large-scale extraction of groundwater in India has led to
overdraft and a fall in the water table); J.M. Sharp, Jr., J.N. Krothe, J.D.
Mather, B. Garcia-Fresca, & C.A. Steward, Effects of Urbanization on
Groundwater Systems, in EARTH SCIENCE IN THE CITY: A READER 262–63 (Grant
Heiken et al. eds., 2003) (explaining that due to the increased pumping, an
aquifer in Texas is no longer able to maintain two major springs that are needed
to “ensure the survival of several species of flora and fauna that only exist” in
that area).
258. See generally General Comment 15, supra note 26.
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water-borne or water-related disease?259 If so, infrastructure for
the proper disposal, treatment, and recycling of wastewater can
be even more costly than drinking-water infrastructure, raising
even greater concerns for cost recovery and the environment.260
The requirement to comply with the minimum core of a provision
right to water requires investment in costly infrastructure like
dams to ensure consistent delivery and emergency storage.261 And
such infrastructure can have serious environmental consequences
in terms of habitat loss and the promotion and breeding of
disease vectors closer to human habitation.262 The lack of full cost
recovery often associated with the provision right approach may
preclude expansion and maintenance of infrastructure, leading
greater numbers of poor people to pay higher prices for lower
quality water from water vendors.263

259. See generally Annette Prüss, David Kay, Lorna Fewtrell & Jamie
Bartram, Estimating the Burden of Disease from Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
at a Global Level, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 537 (2002).
260. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 39 (stating that wastewater
services normally cost more per unit than providing freshwater); GUY HUTTON &
LAURENCE HALLER, EVALUATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF WATER AND
SANITATION IMPROVEMENTS AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 39 (2004) (noting that the costs
in a cost-benefit analysis for water and sanitation interventions are often very
tangible, while benefits are not because they may not be financial in nature).
261. See WILLIAM JOBIN, DAMS AND DISEASE: ECOLOGICAL DESIGN AND HEALTH
IMPACTS OF LARGE DAMS, CANALS AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 3 (1999) (stating that
increasing populations and rising water consumption will require the use of
dams to create greater water reserves).
262. See id. at 21, 29 (noting that dam and canal construction leads to loss of
habitat through deforestation and creates breeding grounds for disease bearing
insects close to human habitation). See generally Jennifer Keiser et al., Effect of
Irrigation and Large Dams on the Burden of Malaria on a Global and Regional
Scale, 72 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 392 (2005) (discussing the impact of
dams and irrigation systems on the prevalence of malaria in nearby human
habitation).
263. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47 (stating that general water subsidies
are usually insufficient and unavailable for service expansion and maintenance
into poor areas, forcing the poor in the developing world to pay water vendors up
to twenty-five times more per liter of water than those paying for subsidized
water); Marianne Kjellén & Gordon McGranahan, Informal Water Vendors and
the Urban Poor, in HUMAN SETTLEMENTS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 12, 16, 17
(2006), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10529IIED.pdf (explaining that it is well
established that the urban poor are more likely to be excluded from piped water
services and therefore may have to pay water vendors, who supply unsafe water,
for their water needs).
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Additionally, to the extent a provision right to water requires
particular universally applied water quality standards, such a
right may also be damaging to human health. Universally applied
water quality standards can produce negative public health
results. For example, disinfectant byproducts (DBPs) are
compounds that result from the reaction of disinfectants (like
chlorine) with organic compounds in water.264 Chronic ingestion
of elevated concentrations of DBPs has been associated with
cancer risk.265 Developed countries have the resources to
concentrate on improving chronic standards of DBPs. Where
chronic DBP standards are applied in developing countries, these
countries tend to focus on compliance with DBP standards by
reducing disinfectant levels.266 The threat posed in these
countries by microbial pathogens that would be removed by
increased disinfectant use is far greater than the threat of chronic
carcinogenic DBP concentrations.267 If the provision right to
water requires water of equal quality everywhere, such a right
may ignore localized conditions to the detriment of public
health.268
264. COMM. TO REVIEW THE NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED MGMT. STRATEGY,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE WATER
SUPPLY 103 (2000).
265. See id. at 104 (showing that the Environmental Protection Agency
believes the overall weight of evidence supports a hazard concern with DBPs in
the water supply); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 296 n.132 (2000) (noting the potential health
problems with disinfectant byproducts and the approaches to addressing them).
266. See Nicholas John Ashbolt, Risk Analysis of Drinking Water Microbial
Contamination Versus Disinfection By-Products (DBPs), 198 TOXICOLOGY 255,
258 (2009) (noting that while environmental factors are important, “it is
generally agreed that DBPs hazards may cause cancers”).
267. See id. at 260 (“[E]fforts to reduce potential health risks from DBP
must not compromise pathogen control, despite socio-political issues.”). The
World Health Organization has cautioned against universal, one-size-fits-all
quality standards, noting that it “must be emphasized that the guideline values
recommend [by the WHO] are not mandatory limits. In order to define such
limits, it is necessary to consider the guideline values in the context of local or
national environmental, social, economic, and cultural conditions.” Ashok
Gadgil, Drinking Water in Developing Countries, 23 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T
253, 255 (1998) (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR
DRINKING-WATER QUALITY VOLUME 2: HEALTH CRITERIA AND OTHER SUPPORTING
INFORMATION (2nd ed. 1996), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/
dwq/2edvol2p1.pdf).
268. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER
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Attempts to formulate a provision right to water invariably
involve prioritization of water uses because of limited resources.
However, prioritization requires an integrated approach,
understanding
the
implications
of
expanding
water
infrastructure for environmental and public health. The
anthropocentric focus on low- or no-cost water services of the
provision right to water raises serious concerns as to its ecologic
sustainability.269 Where the provision right runs counter to the
objective of IWRM because of its narrow focus on drinking water
and its failure to integrate ecological considerations, the provision
right to water may prove damaging to human health and the
environment.270 As noted above, in addition to interfering with
effective IWRM, large general subsidies in the water sector have
potentially harmful implications for the poor and actually could
frustrate efforts to provide affordable water services. Thus, any
ecological damage caused by general public water subsidies is not
necessarily outweighed by expanded access and affordability
achieved through such an approach.
The provision right to water often fails to satisfy the
justifications for a rights-based approach—equity, priority, and
accountability. Because provision rights are often effectively
unenforceable,271 water may not be given high priority by
QUALITY VOLUME 2: HEALTH CRITERIA AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
(2nd ed. 1996), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/2edvol2p1.pdf
(“[T]he adoption of drinking-water standards that are too stringent could limit
the availability of water supplies that meets those standards—a significant
consideration in regions of water shortage.”).
269. See Hammer, supra note 255, at 134–35 (explaining that a state
requirement to provide quality water to its people could conflict with
environmental preservation goals such as the preservation of water). The
human right to water as contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt
an anthropocentric model, whereby the environment exists to serve the basic
needs of human beings.” Id. at 134.
270. See Thompson, supra note 243, at 206, 208 (discussing how the lack of
water-management integration can have a negative impact on the environment
and on the quality of the water supply); United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda
21, ¶ 18.6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II) (Aug. 12, 1992) (“The
fragmentation of responsibilities for water resources development among
sectoral agencies is proving . . . to be an even greater impediment to promoting
integrated water management than had been anticipated.”).
271. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (“Because of the economics of rights
enforcement and the strategic concerns of the judiciary, judges are likely to do
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policymakers, and governments may not be held accountable for
their failure to deliver sufficient quality water. As already noted
in this section, large general subsidies based on a provision right
to water often result in greater inequities in terms of water
provision for the poor, and sustainability issues raise concerns of
intergenerational equity. Ultimately, provision rights must be
evaluated for their pragmatic utility.272 Without such a utilitarian
approach, “provision rights are grounded in nothing more than an
altruistic desire to take a symbolic action without regard for the
interests of the very beneficiaries they purport to benefit” and
reflect only “the conscience of the more privileged.”273
IV. Toward a Participation Right in Water
The provision rights approach to water policy raises potential
problems associated with enforcement, economic and ecologic
sustainability, and public health. This approach often fails to
achieve the aims of a rights framework, including appropriately
prioritizing water, holding governments accountable for water
management, and promoting equitable water policies.274 Indeed,
recent empirical studies comparing nations with provision rights
to water to similar nations without such rights have found that a
provision right to water does little, if anything, to advance
equitable water provision.275 These potential problems are often
associated with lack of resources and effective governance
institutions in developing countries facing water scarcity and
pollution.276 Nevertheless, despite the potential problems
very little to promote the ends commanded by [positive] rights.”).
272. See id. at 878–80 (explaining why the rejection of pragmatism in the
evaluation of positive rights is flawed).
273. Id.; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 143 (1993) (noting that litigation
strategies are not the best way to combat poverty because the lawyers often
have only second-hand knowledge of the issues).
274. See Cross, supra note 11, at 924–25 (concluding that judges will do
little to enforce positive rights even if formally recognized as constitutional).
275. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 6 (asserting that empirical evidence
shows that a constitutional right to water does not produce access to water).
276. See id. at 6–7 (noting that a reason why a right to water does not lead
to water access is because supplying water requires a functioning government).
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associated with the provision rights framework, a right to water
may still advance sustainable and equitable water policies.
An alternative approach, aimed at achieving appropriate
prioritization of water, equitable water policies, and
accountability in water management while avoiding problems of
enforceability and sustainability, is a participation right in water.
A participation right in water, unlike a provision right, would be
immediately binding and enforceable and would not require
courts to make technical determinations regarding the minimum
core substance of the right.277 Additionally, because participation
rights are largely procedural or involve government forbearance
rather than an affirmative obligation to expend resources (at
least not at the level of capital-intensive water infrastructure),
participation rights claims do not raise the same issues of
economic and ecologic sustainability as provision rights.278
Enforcement of participation rights encourages good water
governance, which will lead to improved water provision.
The recent decision in Botswana, Matsipane Mosetlhanyane
v. Attorney General,279 illustrates the potential of a rights-based
approach aimed at governance and enforcement of existing civil
and political rights as an alternative to a provision right to
water.280 The Court of Appeals of Botswana noted that the
Matsipane case is “a harrowing story of human suffering and
despair caused by a shortage of water in the harsh climatic
conditions of the Kalahari Desert where the appellants and their
Basarwa community live.”281 Matsipane was a member of the
Basarwa community that lived in the Central Kalahari Game
277. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (noting that positive rights tend to be
vague and indeterminate, forcing judges to make rulings based on contested
values); Zetland, supra note 32, at 9 (“Property rights strengthen the incentive
to enforce legal or cultural standards of clean water.”).
278. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 11 (stating that privatization of water
delivery leads to better water quality and more efficient water delivery systems
because of more competition).
279. Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶ 20 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.),
http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgementjan-2011.pdf.
280. See id. ¶ 1 (concerning whether the residents of the Central Kalahari
Game Reserve have the ability to recommission a borehole at their own expense
for access to water).
281. Id. ¶ 4.

2238

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013)

Reserve (CKGR), a national park in Botswana. The government
of Botswana changed its policy with respect to the Basarwa
community’s presence in the park after the Basarwa lived within
the CKGR for years.282 As part of an alleged attempt to remove
the Basarwa from the park, in 2002 the government
decommissioned wells that it had previously maintained and that
the community used as its sole source of water.283 The
decommissioning of the wells resulted in serious health
complications for members of the Basarwa community.284 Unlike
in South Africa, there is no provision right to water under the
Constitution of Botswana.
The Basarwa community, however, was able to use a
participation right guaranteed under the Constitution of
Botswana to secure access to water resources.285 The right relied
upon by the Basarwa community, and upheld by the appellate
court, is set forth in Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana,
which provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.”286
Unlike South Africa’s Constitutional Court decision in
Mazibuko,287 which pointed out that the constitutional guarantee
282. Id. ¶¶ 4–7. At the time the CKGR was established, it was expressly
stated that the Basarwa could maintain their nomadic presence in the CKGR.
Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Over the years, however, the Basarwa had established permanent
settlements in the CKGR. Id. ¶ 4. The government of Botswana determined that
permanent settlements were not compatible with the ecological conservation
purposes of the CKGR and that the Basarwa community should be relocated. Id.
283. Id. ¶ 8. In 1986, the De Beers Company agreed that a prospecting
borehole installed by the company within the CKGR could be used by the
Basarwa community as a well for domestic water use. Id. ¶ 5. The Ghanzi
District Council, a municipal governmental entity, maintained the well pump on
the borehole and provided fuel for the pump engine. Id. ¶ 6.
284. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
285. The trial court in Matsipane denied the Basarwa community’s claim of
access to the borehole in part because the court interpreted water law in
Botswana to require an administratively issued water right in order to
withdraw groundwater. Id. ¶ 13. The Basarwa had no such administratively
issued water right in connection with its withdrawals from the De Beers
borehole. Id. ¶ 5. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision
regarding the requirement of a water right, holding that “any person who
lawfully occupies or owns land has a right to sink a borehole on such land for
domestic purposes without a water right.” Id. ¶ 16.
286. Id. ¶ 19 (citing CONST. Sept. 30, 1966, ch. II, § 7(1) (Bots.)).
287. Supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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at issue was conditioned on “progressive realization,” the
appellate court in Botswana noted that the constitutional
guarantee at issue in Matsipane is “absolute and unqualified.”288
The appellate court concluded, given how the community suffered
from lack of water, that denial of access to the borehole
constituted a violation of the Basarwa’s constitutionally
guaranteed right to be free from degrading treatment.289 The
wells were recommissioned and maintained by the government,
with the Basarwa paying tariffs for maintenance of the wells.290
The court’s decision immediately secured water resources for the
Basarwa without being limited by available resources or
requiring the court to make a technical determination of a
minimum core, and the decision did not require an unsustainable
approach to water provision.291
The next subpart proposes an alternative approach to the
right to water, framing the right to water as a participation right.
Subpart A proposes and evaluates a participation right in water,
and argues that such a right can be immediately and effectively
implemented in many countries if based on the public trust
doctrine. Subpart B considers the limitations of a participation
right in water generally and a participation right in water based
on the public trust doctrine specifically. Finally, subpart C
discusses how assertion of a participation right in water, despite
not guaranteeing a minimum core of quality or quantity, would
ultimately promote the development and implementation of
sustainable and equitable water policies essential for the
provision of a minimum core of water quality and supply for all.
A. A Participation Right in Water and the Public Trust Doctrine
The Matsipane case illustrates how claims based on
participation rights can facilitate water access for disadvantaged
people
while
avoiding
issues
of
sustainability
and
288. Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Attorney Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-07410, ¶ 19 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf.
289. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.
290. Id. ¶ 25.
291. Id.
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enforceability.292 In Matsipane, the Basarwa successfully secured
access and control over water resources and compelled the
government to restore and maintain water infrastructure by
relying on an enforceable participation right that did not require
the court to engage in technical determinations of water
management for which it was ill-suited.293
Such participation rights claims could be framed in several
ways. First, where water services are provided, denied, or
withdrawn because of government discrimination on the basis of
gender, ethnicity, race, or religion, such water policy would
violate broadly accepted participation rights to equal
protection.294 For example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
commented on Israel’s approach to water provision in Palestinian
territories, arguing that denial of water could constitute a
violation of the right to equal protection under the law.295
292. Id. (“[D]ecision reflects broader protection of indigenous peoples on land
marked as game preserves.”).
293. Id. ¶ 16 (concluding that Basarwa do not require a water right for the
use of the borehole). Scholars of the human right to food have recently argued in
favor of focusing on supply side solutions to hunger, arguing that in lieu of food
programs, more should be done with “expanding social and political rights” as
more effective in combating hunger. J. Craig Jenkins, Stephen J. Scanlan &
Lindsey Peterson, Military Famine, Human Rights, and Child Hunger: A CrossNational Analysis, 1990–2000, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 823, 823 (2007). States
that protect civil rights experience three times the rate of economic growth of
states that fail to protect those rights, creating a resource pool from which a
state can provide primary goods for citizen interests. Gerald W. Scully, The
Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 652, 661
(1988).
294. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and
Its Pitfalls: Learning from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1, 3 (2010) (“The principle of nondiscrimination prohibits any distinction,
exclusion, restriction, or preference that is based on any grounds, such as race,
color, or other identifiable individual or group distinctions.”).
295. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Israel, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sept. 3,
2010), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/448/06/PDF/G10448
06.pdf (“The Committee is concerned at water shortages disproportionately
affecting the Palestinian population of the West Bank . . . . The State party
should ensure that all residents of the West Bank have equal access to water, in
accordance with the World Health Organization quality and quantity
standards.”); McGraw, supra note 98, at 147 (noting that the Human Rights
Committee first recognized the denial of water as a violation of the right to
equal protection under the law in its 2010 report).
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Importantly, the only two instances where a right to water is
referenced explicitly in binding international law treaties are in
the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)296 and the Convention
on the Rights of Children (CRC),297 two conventions directed at
protecting classes of people against discrimination.
Second, in some circumstances, communities could assert
that government water policy constitutes a violation of the
broadly accepted right to religious liberty.298 For example, for
certain communities, rivers have religious significance.299 Where
government policy relating to water abstractions or water quality
in that river interferes with religious worship, such communities
could allege that government action violates guarantees of
religious freedom.300
296. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180, at 196 (Dec. 18, 1979)
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/378/07/IMG/NR037807
.pdf [hereinafter CEDAW] (“State Parties . . . shall ensure to such women the
right . . . [t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to
housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and
communications.”).
297. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25, at 169–70 (Nov. 20, 1989) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
44/a44r025.htm [hereinafter CRC] (“State Parties shall pursue full
implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate
measures . . . [t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including within the
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia . . . the provision of
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water . . . .”).
298. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or
Belief: International Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 503–12
(2005) (describing international conventions that protect the freedom of
religion).
299. See, e.g., Diana L. Eck, Ganga: The Goddess Ganges in Hindu Sacred
Geography, in DEVI: GODDESS OF INDIA 137, 137 (John S. Hawley & Donna M.
Wulff eds., 1996) (“Along her entire length the Ganga is sacred, and just as a
temple or a holy city might be circumambulated, so is the entire river
circumambulated . . . .”); Kheryn Klubnikin et al., The Sacred and the Scientific:
Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Siberian River Conservation, 10
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1296, 1304–05 (2000) (describing the cultural and
religious significance of the Katun River to indigenous groups in the Altai
Mountain region of Siberia).
300. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A.
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, at 7 (Sept. 13, 2007) http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf
[hereinafter
IP
Declaration]
(“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive
spiritual relationships with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and
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Third, governmental policy interfering with or appropriating
property rights without just compensation or due process
constitutes an unlawful exercise of eminent domain authority and
a violation of a broadly accepted participation right recognized
under international law.301 Where individuals or communities
have secured a property interest in water and the government
unjustly or arbitrarily interferes with that interest, such
interference could constitute a participation rights violation.302
For example, where an irrigation district had a governmentissued right to use water in California, the California
government’s regulations protecting certain endangered species
that limited that water right violated citizens’ participation
rights to be free from unjust and arbitrary exercises of eminent
domain.303
These types of claims, as well as the participation rights
claim in Matsipane based on a right to be free from inhumane
treatment,304 have certain potential advantages over a provision
used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources . . . .”);
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008)
(Fletcher, J. dissenting) (arguing that the use of recycled wastewater that
contains 0.0001% human waste in the artificial snowmaking process on
federally owned public land that has religious and cultural significance to
southwestern Indian tribes violates the tribes’ free exercise of religion); see also
supra Part II.C (providing examples of international and domestic provisions
that either explicitly or implicitly grant a legal right to water access).
301. See, e.g., CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53 (“All people may . . . freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence.”). See generally Michael G. Parisi,
Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in
International Law, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2005).
302. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
303. See generally Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States,
49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); see also Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543
F.3d 1276, 1288–97 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (analyzing the government’s diversion of
canal water for the purpose of protecting an endangered fish species under the
physical taking paradigm).
304. Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10,
¶ 20 (Civ. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (“It was submitted
on the appellants’ behalf that the Government’s refusal to allow them
permission to use, at their own expense, the [well] . . . for domestic purposes
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rights approach. The right at issue is immediately binding and
not conditioned on available resources. Unlike provision rights,
enforcement of a participation right does not require the court to
make technical determinations regarding a minimum core, but
rather tells the government it must either cease a particular
action or return what it has taken.305 Additionally, because these
rights demand government forbearance, participation rights do
not implicate the same concerns for economic sustainability as an
affirmative duty to provide a certain amount and quality of water
under a provision right.306
Under international law, the advantages of a participation
rights approach are even more pronounced. Participation rights
guaranteed under the CP Covenant are jurisprudentially mature
and allow for claims to be brought by non-state actors under a
binding Optional Protocol,307 unlike provision rights enumerated
in the ESC Covenant.308 The central concern for advocates of a
amounts to degrading treatment . . . .”).
305. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 324 (requiring the
government to pay for the water that was taken for public use).
306. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 4 (“Positive rights are hard to define and
costly to provide . . . . We cannot tell when action, of a certain quality, quantity
or price, is enough. It costs nothing to supply an increased demand for negative
rights, but the cost of positive rights grows with demand (e.g., population).”).
307. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), at 59 (Dec. 16,
1966), http://www.un-documents.net/a21r2200.htm (“A State Party to the
Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from
individuals . . . who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”); JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 206, at 105
(explaining the domestic remedies that a complainant must exhaust before
seeking redress internationally through the CP Covenant). Similar claims based
on civil rights guaranteeing equal protection and religious freedom could also be
asserted under the CP Covenant. See CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 54 (“All
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.”); id. at 55 (“Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”).
308. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 462 (2004) (“Ever since the adoption of the [ESC
Covenant] . . . proponents of economic, social, and cultural rights have
complained that the [ESC Covenant] lacks oversight and implementation
mechanisms equal to those provided in the [CP Covenant] and its first Optional
Protocol.”). But see Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc.
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right to water under international law is arguably to give effect to
the central reason for such a right—which is to provide legal
leverage for disenfranchised or economically disadvantaged
peoples to influence the development of water policy. No such
leverage exists under international law without an adjudicative
process and a binding Optional Protocol.309
However, there are obvious limitations to these types of
participation rights claims. In Matsipane, in particular, the right
at issue is a broad and rather uniquely formulated right.310 The
situation in Matsipane is so peculiarly well-suited to a successful
claim under such a unique right as to provide little guidance on
what a participation right in water would look like in other
countries and under more common circumstances.311 Still, a
participation rights approach, like those more general claims
discussed above,312 remains problematic for more broadly
applicable reasons.
First, such claims do not, in and of themselves, constitute a
participation right in water. Rather, the issue of water is
incidental to the violation of some other participation right.313
A/RES/63/117, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2008) (“Communications may be submitted by or on
behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State
Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and
cultural rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party.”).
309. See Dennis & Stewart, supra note 308, at 463 (“[S]tate compliance with
economic, social, and cultural rights must be ‘justiciable’—subject to the
possibility of formal third-party adjudication, with remedies for findings of
noncompliance.”).
310. See Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-07410, ¶ 25 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (asserting both that
the appellants had an inherent right to access water by reopening an existing
well and that the government refrain from preventing the exercising of that
right).
311. Nevertheless, under Part III, Article 7 of the CP Covenant, “[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53. The Basarwa community’s
claim that the government violated its negative right to be free from torture or
inhuman punishment or treatment could be asserted in an international
tribunal. See Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶ 19 (discussing the
right to be free from torture or inhuman punishment).
312. Supra Part IV.
313. See, e.g., CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53 (prohibiting torture and
inhuman and cruel treatment or punishment, but never specifically mentioning
access to water).
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Second, these claims assume both access to water and that the
state is simply discriminating in its provision or management.314
These assumptions may not apply in many cases, particularly in
developing countries, and do not necessarily provide more or
better water to those in need of improved quantity and quality.
Such an assumption is particularly problematic with regards to
claims of an unlawful exercise of eminent domain, because the
assumption is that the aggrieved party has existing entitlements
or property rights.315 Those most in need of a right to water are
also those least likely to have such entitlements and property
protected by participation rights. Third, reallocating water on the
basis of these types of claims may not necessarily be more
equitable. Claims of discrimination or infringement on religious
liberties could result in inequitable allocations of water.
The challenge, therefore, is how to formulate a participation
right in water—one that is sustainable, immediately enforceable,
jurisprudentially mature, and avoids compelling courts to make
technical determinations for which they are ill-suited. At the
same time, such a participation right must be broadly applicable
and grounded on widely accepted legal doctrines directly
applicable to water apportionment and quality. Furthermore, a
participation right in water must satisfy the three justifications
for applying a rights framework to water policy—equity, priority,
and accountability. While a participation right in water can be
grounded on existing civil or political rights (as seen in
Matsipane)316 or expressly incorporated into national
constitutions, the public trust doctrine provides the foundation
for a participation right in water meeting these criteria that can
be broadly and immediately implemented in many parts of the
world.
The “public trust doctrine” is a common legal doctrine with
roots in Roman and British law recognized in many countries,
314. See, e.g., Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶¶ 1–9 (establishing
the Basarwa community’s right to recommission a previously existing well).
315. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (3d ed. 1909) (“Eminent domain is the right or power of a
sovereign State to appropriate private property to particular uses, for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare.” (emphasis added)).
316. See Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶¶ 1–9 (establishing the
Basarwa community’s right to recommission a previously existing well).
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whereby water is seen as being held in trust by the government
for the benefit of all citizens.317 As noted above, while the public
trust doctrine is interpreted and applied differently through the
world, it is widely recognized legal doctrine in many parts of
Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe.318 Furthermore, the
public trust doctrine is increasingly recognized as binding
customary international law and a canon of interpretation of
international environmental law.319
Citizens thus do not own water under the public trust
doctrine.320 Instead, they hold usufructuary rights rather than
exclusive-possessory ownership.321 That right to use water held in
trust by the state is subject to conditions imposed by the state
trustee, typically the requirement that any use be “reasonable
and beneficial.”322 Thus, the government owns water in trust for
317. See Sax, supra note 51, at 475 (describing the historical background of
the public trust doctrine).
318. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 760–808 (finding applications
of the public trust doctrine in many countries, including India, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and
Canada).
319. See id. at 748 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the public trust doctrine has
become institutionalized and, in the process, moved to the forefront of
environmental protection in several countries.”); Edith Brown Weiss,
Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 398 (Edith Brown
Weiss ed., 1992) (“The theory of intergenerational equity has a deep basis in
international law.”); William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 714–19 (2012) (arguing that
courts rely on the public trust doctrine as a cannon of interpretation even when
ruling on non-aquatic resources); Thompson, supra note 9, at 35 (noting that the
public trust doctrine could be used in connection with customary international
law to establish a human right to water); Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder,
Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 696 (2008) (“A strong
parallel to the public trust doctrine can be seen in international law, where
various conventions and declarations identify water as a basic human right,
either on its own or as a necessary incident of other human rights.”).
320. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 50 (“Water is a crucial public resource,
and its fluid nature requires that the government limit private rights to the
‘right to use’ water that ultimately belongs to the public and is held in trust for
us by the government.”).
321. See id. (“By expanding the public trust doctrine to support a public
stewardship model, the management and allocation of this unique common
resource will be entrusted to the government for the public good.”).
322. See id. at 64–69 (describing the state’s resource management
obligations under the public trust doctrine); Michael C. Blumm & Thea
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all citizens but recognizes the rights of individual citizens to use
water so long as that use is beneficial (in other words, is not
wasteful) and reasonable (in other words, does not impair the
beneficial use of another right-holder). The public trust doctrine
is both a negative limitation on private property interests in
water and an affirmative obligation of the government to protect
water resources held in trust for all.323
The dual nature of the public trust doctrine provides the
basis of a participation right in water. The interests all citizens
have as beneficiaries of the public trust constitute a property
interest in water resources.324 Essentially, the interest held by
the citizens in public trust property begins at the negative
limitation on the usufructuary water rights of individuals—
citizens have a right to ensure that property held in trust is used
both reasonably and beneficially.325 Where government action
impairs or interferes with that trust interest (in other words,
water is used unreasonably or not beneficially), individual
citizens’ participation rights to be free from unjust or arbitrary
exercises of eminent domain are violated.326 Where the
government breaches its obligation to manage water held in the

Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 701, 722 (1995) (“The union of the appropriation system and the public
trust doctrine meant that the property right in water was correlative, . . . water
diverters have no right to a fixed quantity of water, only a reasonable beneficial
use that accommodates trust uses where feasible.”).
323. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 950–54
(2012) (identifying four definitions for the public trust doctrine, including a duty
to manage resources for the public’s benefit and a limitation on private
ownership of trust resources). Where government actions have interfered with
these usufructuary water rights, there has been a debate as to whether such
interference constitutes an exercise of eminent domain. See generally LEWIS,
supra note 315. This debate is outside the scope of this Article.
324. See Sax, supra note 51, at 478 (“The most common theory advanced in
support of a special trust obligation is a property notion . . . .”).
325. See id. at 485 (“[O]ne does not own a property right in water in the
same way he owns his watch or his shoes, but . . . he owns only an usufruct—an
interest that incorporates the need of others.”).
326. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 55 (“If we deem water to be a property
right, government restrictions on the right to use water may result in a finding
that water users must be justly compensated under the Takings Clause and
may also generate due process or equal protection claims.”).
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public trust, that breach violates citizens’ participation right in
water.
The participation right in water under the public trust
doctrine is both procedural and substantive. However, it does not
require the state to affirmatively provide water to anyone—only
to ensure that it meets due process requirements in water
resource management and complies with the requirements to
manage public trust property in accordance with the principles of
reasonable and beneficial use.327 Where the state infringes upon
the interests of its citizens in public trust property by failing to
manage water in accordance with the principles of reasonable
and beneficial use, water rights allocations and discharge
authorizations may be revoked or suspended pending review. The
public trust doctrine has been applied in many jurisdictions
internationally, with broad implications for the state’s authority
to condition water abstraction, use, and discharge permits, as
well as water service concession contracts.328 State water
management decisions, including authorizations of discharges,
allocations of water rights, and concession contracts for
ownership or operation of water infrastructure, should comply
with principles of due process, including adequate public notice,
transparency, and stakeholder participation. Water policy
decisions taken inconsistent with these due process requirements
would be void pending remediation of the procedural defect.329
South Africa and Mazibuko provide excellent context to
understand how the participation right in water based on the
public trust doctrine would operate in practice.330 The public trust
doctrine is enshrined in South Africa’s National Water Act331 and
327. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 319, at 691–99 (describing the nature
of water rights under the public trust doctrine).
328. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 760–808 (finding developed
public trust doctrines in at least ten countries).
329. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 104 (“In addition to a takings claim,
litigants seeking a remedy from the government for interference with their
water rights may assert claims that the government action has deprived them of
due process (procedural and/or substantive) and/or equal protection.”).
330. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 23–34
paras. 46–68 (S. Afr.) (defining the obligations imposed upon the state by a
constitution that grants the right of access to sufficient water).
331. See National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S. Afr.) (“As the public trustee
of the nation’s water resources the National Government, acting through the
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the National Environmental Management Act.332 Instead of
pursuing a provision rights claim, Mazibuko and the residents of
Phiri could have claimed that the prepaid water program
deprived them of their property interest, held as beneficiaries of
the public trust, without due process. Additionally, Mazibuko and
the residents of Phiri could allege that Johannesburg failed to
manage water resources consistent with the principles of
reasonable and beneficial use by establishing an inadequate
water provision system that failed to account for household size,
consumption patterns, and ability to pay. The remedy would have
been suspension of the prepaid free basic water program pending
an improved process involving stakeholders from Phiri and the
establishment of a record justifying the city’s ultimate
approach.333 A similar approach could be taken in other countries
mentioned above where the public trust doctrine is a recognized
feature of their jurisprudence and where they face challenges in
developing equitable water policies, including India, the United
States, Bolivia, and Botswana.334 This approach may also be
viable as the public trust doctrine achieves increasing recognition
as customary international law in international tribunals.335
A participation right in water, like a provision right, puts
first things first. However, unlike a provision right, a
Minister, must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved,
managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit
of all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate.”).
332. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 2(4)(o) (S. Afr.)
(“The environment is held in public trust for the people, the beneficial use of
environmental resources must serve the public interest and the environment
must be protected as the people’s common heritage.”); see also Robyn Stein,
Water Law in a Democratic South Africa: A Country Case Study Examining the
Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2167, 2167 (2005) (“The
public trust doctrine forms the cornerstone of the public rights system
introduced by the National Water Act.”).
333. See supra Part III (describing the relevance of the Mazibuko case to the
distinction between a provision right and a participation right).
334. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, for a description of the public
trust doctrine in the United States, India, and around the world.
335. See David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human
Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 734 (2008)
(“As an emerging norm in customary international law that is codified in ever
more numerous documents in more and more corners of the world,
Environmental Human Rights have enormous potential to create new
prohibitions on what a private property owner may do with her land.”).
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participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine
would be immediately enforceable and grounded on a broadly
accepted legal doctrine commonly applied to water management.
Additionally, such a right does not compel courts to make
technical determinations for which they are ill-suited. Because a
participation right in water would not necessarily require
provision of a certain quantity or quality of water at a certain
price, it does not raise the problems of sustainability associated
with a provision right.336 Furthermore, a participation right in
water based on the public trust doctrine would allow citizens to
hold their governments accountable for mismanagement of water
resources. Finally, the participation right in water empowers
disadvantaged people to engage in the development of water
policy, thereby promoting equitable provision of sufficient,
affordable, and clean water.
B. Evaluating the Limitations of the Participation Right in Water
Despite its advantages over a provision right, the
participation right in water is no panacea. A participation rights
approach in water policy in general has several potential
limitations, including the following: (1) participation rights are
not adequately protected in those countries suffering most from
water stress and many of these countries do not recognize the
public trust doctrine or do so in ways not suitable to support a
participation right in water; (2) disadvantaged people are no
more likely to prevail under a participation rights approach than
a provision rights approach in court; (3) the cost of asserting
participation rights effectively precludes their use for
disadvantaged peoples; (4) without a guaranteed minimum core,
the participation rights approach raises concerns of inequitable
water pricing; and (5) a participation rights approach is an
iterative, ad hoc approach lacking the integrated, centralized
character of a provision right to water. The participation right in
water based on the public trust addresses some of these potential
336. For an example of the allocation complications of provision rights, see
Mazibuko v. Johannesburg, 2010 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 6–9 paras. 10–18 (S. Afr.),
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf (describing the inefficiency of
water distribution in South Africa under a provision rights system).
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limitations but features other limitations of its own as well. This
subsection evaluates these potential limitations of a participation
right in water generally, and the participation right to water
based on the public trust specifically, concluding that despite the
potential limitations, the participation right in water remains a
promising avenue for addressing problems of inequity and
sustainability in water policy.
The first objection to a participation rights approach to water
generally is that participation rights are not adequately protected
in many countries, and perhaps most particularly in countries
suffering from water stress and lacking the governance
institutions necessary to address water stress. Instability,
poverty, war, and corruption have prevented or slowed
development of equitable and sustainable water policy in many
parts of the world, with a lack of enforceable participation rights
associated with such governance challenges partially attributable
to failures in water policy in such countries.337 Indeed,
government incompetence or corruption is often as much a cause
of drought as the climate.338 Strengthening civil society,
improving governance institutions, combating corruption through
transparency, and protecting civil and political rights is essential
for equitable and sustainable water resource management.339

337. See generally Gadgil, supra note 267.
338. See Nejat Anbarci et al., The Ill Effects of Public Sector Corruption in
the Water and Sanitation Sector, 85 LAND ECON. 363, 366 (2009) (“That
corruption is pervasive in the water and sanitation sector seems beyond
dispute.”); Janelle Plummer, Water and Corruption: A Destructive Partnership,
in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2008 3, 3–17, http://archive.transparency.org/
content/download/32766/502089 (arguing that corruption in water sectors
exacerbates the water inaccessibility worldwide); Muhammad Sohail & Sue
Cavill, Water for the Poor: Corruption in Water Supply and Sanitation, GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REP., 2008, at 40, 41, http://archive.transparency.org/publications/
gcr/gcr_2008 (“More than any other group, the poor are the main victims of the
global water crisis. . . . Corruption is a major force driving . . . the growing global
water crisis.”).
339. See generally Emmanuelle Auriol & Aymeric Blanc, Capture and
Corruption in Public Utilities: The Cases of Water and Electricity in SubSaharan Africa, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 203 (2009). States that protect civil rights
experience three times the rate of economic growth of states that fail to protect
those rights, creating a resource pool from which a state can provide primary
goods for citizen interests. Scully, supra note 293, at 661.
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Additionally, the public trust doctrine, despite being accepted
in many countries, is not recognized in all nations.340 Even where
it is recognized, it may be applied in ways unsuitable to support a
participation right in water.341 Successful implementation of the
participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine
will be limited, at least at first, to those countries with strong
governance institutions, a public trust doctrine recognized and
applied in ways facilitating a participation right in water, but
facing water stress issues. More research will be needed on the
suitability of particular states for this approach, but India and
South Africa appear to meet the necessary criteria to successfully
implement a participation right in water based on the public
trust doctrine.342
One potential avenue for addressing the challenge of the
limited geographic scope of the participation right to water is
through an appeal to international law. Supranational
organizations teach national governments how to govern by
means of developing and encouraging international discourse and
norms, in a process called “constructivism.”343 The Optional
Protocol to the CP Covenant allows nonstate actors to bring
participation rights claims against their governments, thereby
facilitating developing norms.344 As noted above, the public trust
doctrine and the right to be free from arbitrary deprivations of
340. See generally Mary Turnipseed et al., Reinvigorating the Public Trust
Doctrine: Expert Opinion on the Potential of a Public Trust Mandate in U.S. and
International Environmental Law, 52 ENV’T 6 (2010).
341. See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (explaining that the lack of private or charitable
trust equivalents in some contemporary European civil legal systems
complicates the operation of public trusts in those systems).
342. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, 414–15 (India)
(finding that a lease of public land approving blasting within a national park
violated the public trust doctrine); Robyn Stein, South Africa’s New Democratic
Water Legislation: National Government’s Role as Public Trustee in Dam
Building and Management Activities, 18 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 284,
284–95 (2000) (analyzing the South African government’s role as public trustee
under the National Water Act 36 of 1998).
343. M.C. Mehta, 1 S.C.C. at 414–15.
344. See Optional Protocol to the CP Covenant, supra note 206, at 59 (“A
State Party . . . recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim
to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in
the Covenant.”).
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property are both recognized under international law.345 As such,
claims of violations of a participation right in water based on the
public trust doctrine could facilitate discourse on equitable and
sustainable water policy and encourage the development of such
norms in national governments.
A second objection to a participation rights approach in
general is that disadvantaged people are perhaps no more likely
to prevail under such an approach than under a provision rights
approach. For example, the plaintiffs in Mazibuko asserted
participation rights claims.346 They argued that the prepaid
meters approach was unconstitutional because it was imposed in
Phiri, and not in other areas of Johannesburg, based on racial
discrimination.347 The lower courts each held in favor of the
plaintiffs,348 but this holding was reversed by the Constitutional
Court.349 The Constitutional Court held that the prepaid meters
and “free basic water” approach were taken in Phiri because Phiri
was the township with the greatest amount of nonrevenue water
in Johannesburg, not because of race.350 The Constitutional
Court, however, was arguably too quick to disentangle the
challenge of cost recovery in Phiri from the township’s racial
history. In any event, Mazibuko is as much an example of the
limits of a participation rights approach as it is of the problems of
provision rights. However, the complex relationship between
discrimination of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and
inequalities in resource allocation is a limitation inherent in the
adjudication of any kind of right.351
345. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 319, at 696 (“A strong parallel to the
public trust doctrine can be seen in international law, where various
conventions and declarations identify water as a basic human right, either on its
own or as a necessary incident of other human rights.”).
346. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 21–23 paras.
44–45 (S. Afr.).
347. Id. at 78 para. 148.
348. Id. at 12–18 paras. 26–40.
349. See id. at 87 para. 169 (holding “neither the Free Basic Water policy
nor the introduction of prepaid water meters in Phiri . . . constitute a breach of
section 27 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the respondents’ appeals succeed
and the order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal should be set aside”).
350. See id. at 78 para. 149 (discussing the Constitutional Court’s finding
that the water system was implemented for economic and not racial purposes).
351. See Cross, supra note 11, at 881 (discussing the relative difficulties poor
communities face when attempting to litigate rights).
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On the other hand, Matsipane is arguably as much an
example of the potential of a provision rights approach as it is of
a participation rights approach. While the court in Matsipane
ultimately held in favor of the Basarwa based on a participation
right, the court bolstered its argument by relying on provision
rights rhetoric.352 The court, in deciding in favor of the Basarwa,
relied on the 2010 U.N. Resolution and General Comment 15 in
support of their holding that the closure of the borehole violated
the constitution of Botswana.353 As such, while the typical
formulation of the provision right to water is problematic from a
legal and sustainability perspective,354 it still has rhetorical and
political value, as illustrated in Matsipane.
Inequality is arguably an inevitable feature of any water
policy in any nation with a history of discrimination, and
participation rights claims will sometimes fail.355 Nevertheless,
such facts do nothing to counter the advantage such an approach
has over a provision rights approach in terms of enforceability
and sustainability. Furthermore, the rhetorical and political
value of a provision rights approach does not fully counteract the
unsustainable practices often associated with that framework,
nor does it fully ameliorate the jurisprudential immaturity of that
approach.356
A third limitation of a participation rights approach to water
policy in general is that asserting such rights is costly, which
limits the availability of rights-based claims to those who need
them most.357 In his book on poverty and the law, Chris Smith
352. See Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-07410, ¶ 25 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/
sites/default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (stating “the
correct interpretation of Section 6 is that an owner or occupier of land intending
to sink or deepen any well or borehole thereon and abstract water therefrom for
domestic purposes, may do so only in accordance with a water right granted
under the Act”).
353. Id. at 37–39.
354. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 681 n.3 (describing
inadequacy of legal mechanisms for obtaining access to water).
355. See id. at 689 (recognizing inherent discrimination against poor
communities and women as noted by Judge Tsoka in Mazibuko).
356. See id. at 692–93 (describing the unsustainability of the Phiri water
program, an example of the provision right approach, despite the high political
and social goals the policy was intended to serve).
357. See Cross, supra note 11, at 881 (“Rights enforcement requires
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concludes that “legal doctrine and court processes can
significantly disadvantage poor people who seek to pursue
claims.”358 The cost of litigation limits the effectiveness of rights
enforcement regardless of whether the right is framed as a
provision right or participation right.359 However, while much
could potentially be done to reduce costs related to, or increase
the availability of, adjudication of participation rights, the rights
remain an important and comparatively effective avenue for the
poor to protect their interests by legal means.360
A fourth potential limitation of the participation rights
approach in general is the risk of inequitable pricing. Under a
provision rights approach, a legal guarantee of a minimum core of
water with a maximum price set at an affordable level would,
arguably, at least ensure water for all. Without such a guarantee,
water pricing and cost recovery efforts, including privatization of
water resources and infrastructure, could result in decreased
access and increased costs for the poor.361 Privatization of water
as a commodity obviously has challenges, as illustrated by the
Bolivean government’s approach in Cochabamba.362 Nevertheless,
as noted above, privatization is not the same thing as water
pricing.363 Water pricing, regardless of the method, must take
resources . . . . Poor individuals and, to a degree, groups representing the poor
may lack the resources to advance effectively the right.”).
358. SMITH, supra note 200, at 5.
359. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880 (“[R]ights enforcement requires
resources. . . . The ability to litigate ‘depends on ample purses and effective
mobilization of legal services, which vary greatly among different classes,
groups, and sections of the country.’” (quoting J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF
APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 17 (1981))).
360. See Graber, supra note 200, at 787 (arguing judicial process can serve
the interests of the poor in certain cases); Douglass Cassel, Does International
Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 128–29 (2001)
(suggesting the ability to litigate human rights under international treaties
bolsters enforcement of government duties).
361. See GABRIEL BITRAN & EDUARDO VALENZUELA, WORLD BANK, WATER
SERVICES IN CHILE: COMPARING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 3 (2003)
(describing rising rates and moral questions following the privatization of
Chilean water programs).
362. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (describing Cochabamba,
Bolivia’s privatization of the city’s water supply in order to pay for
infrastructure improvements).
363. See Glennon, supra note 40, at 1892–93 (discussing different models of
privatization and water pricing).
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into account social factors, including the ability of the poor to
pay.364 In any event, “privatization” is a misnomer in almost all
cases, given the extensive governmental involvement through
regulatory oversight and in concession contracting, and typically
as the public trustee of the water resources themselves.365
However, this raises the question of whether a provision
rights approach is faulty in the abstract, or whether the common
formulation and implementation of such rights lead to the
problems of enforceability and sustainability discussed in this
Article. Arguably, the failure to effectively implement a provision
right to water in South Africa, as illustrated in Mazibuko, is not
evidence of a fundamentally incurable flaw of the provision right
framework but, instead, of failure in South Africa to effectively
frame and implement that right.366 In any event, concerns of
enforceability are common with respect to a provision rights
approach in any context, not just in water policy.367 Furthermore,
concerns related to enforceability are arguably mooted by noting
that countries are better off imposing a duty on the government
to make progress with respect to provision of essential goods and
services even if the duty is effectively unenforceable.368
364. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 18–19 (explaining the World
Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure has coined the concept of “sustainable
cost recovery,” which embraces the goal of full cost-recovery in the long-term
while also supporting targeted “pro-poor” policies).
365. See Private Passions, supra note 67 (explaining factors that affect water
privatization models, including government taxation, investment, and social
considerations). The Dublin Statement, a United Nations document addressing
water sustainability policy, provides that water has “economic value in all its
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” The Dublin
Statement, supra note 142, at 4. As such, international law arguably does not
view privatization as a per se violation of the human right to water. See
McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 23 (recognizing water as a finite, vulnerable, and
essential resource that must be preserved through better—but undefined—
government management and the development of human rights law).
366. See supra notes 346–51 and accompanying text (discussing Mazibuko
and the challenges of allocating resources under a provision rights approach).
367. See Herman Schwartz, The Wisdom and Enforceability of Welfare
Rights as Constitutional Rights, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 2–3 (2001) (discussing the
inclusion of social and economic rights in constitutions despite concerns about
enforceability).
368. See id. (explaining that rights may be enforced by the judiciary or
legislature, but even if they are unenforced, there is no evidence that nonenforcement negatively affects the enforcement of other rights); Richard A.
Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and
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Nevertheless, it is the very effort to comply with this duty that
raises the challenge most unique to a rights-based approach to
water—sustainability. The challenge of sustainability, arising
from concerns unique to water policy, such as the perceived low
value of water, its cultural meaning, its nature as a public good
and ecological commons, societal reluctance to pay full cost for
water services, and the relatively high costs associated with
water infrastructure369 make water a particularly poor candidate
for a provision right. Until the challenge of sustainability is
effectively addressed in the formulation and implementation of a
provision right to water, the participation right in water remains
the preferred rights-based framework in water policy.370
A fifth limitation of a general participation rights approach
to water policy is that a provision rights approach is arguably a
more integrated, centralized approach, whereas the participation
rights approach is iterative and piecemeal. Such an approach
may address the most egregious cases of water policy injustice,
but it fails to expand and maintain access to clean, sufficient,
affordable, and sustainable water for all.371 However, governance
by litigation, whether under a provision rights or participation
rights regime, is by nature iterative and piecemeal.372
Furthermore, there could be value in prioritizing those instances
where egregious water policy failures are attributable not to a
for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (examining whether the right to
government protection is legally enforceable).
369. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 151–59 (detailing the challenges inherent
to building, regulating, and maintaining water-related infrastructure).
370. See Andreas Neef, Lost in Translation: The Participatory Imperative
and Local Water Governance in North Thailand and Southwest Germany, in 1
WATER ALTERNATIVES 89, 105 (2008) (noting the participation rights framework
is the preferred model for ensuring water rights, despite the difficulties posed by
its implementation). The formulation and implementation of a more robust,
sustainable, and enforceable provision right to water is outside the scope of this
Article. However, the approach taken by the government of Chile has been one
of the most successful in achieving cost-recovery with effective pro-poor policies
in water services. See BITRAN & VALENZUELA, supra note 361, at 2–4 (analyzing
the development of Chile’s water services system). See generally ROUSE, supra
note 71.
371. See Neef, supra note 370, at 105–06 (providing examples of the
participation rights model’s failure to provide equitable water rights for all
citizens from data in case studies in Germany and Thailand).
372. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880–84 (discussing the challenges of rights
enforcement though litigation).
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lack of state or resources but instead to a violation of
participation rights, including a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
by the state under the public trust doctrine. Such an iterative
approach not only prioritizes the most egregious cases of water
stress due to malfeasance but allows for nuanced and adaptive
consideration of localized conditions in responding to these cases.
The participation right in water based on the public trust
doctrine shares some of the potential limitations of a general
participation rights approach to water policy. But the
participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine has
two additional potential limitations. First, the public trust
doctrine is not recognized in all jurisdictions.373 The public trust
doctrine has its roots in Roman law, and continues to enjoy
recognition throughout much of Europe, persisting into the
common law in the United States.374 However, there are many
nations that do not recognize the public trust doctrine, at least
not in a form that would facilitate a participation right in water
as described above.375 Furthermore, equating a breach of the
fiduciary duty with the infringement of a participation right is a
significant reconceptualization of the public trust doctrine.
Nevertheless, the broad acceptance of the public trust doctrine in
many nations makes the doctrine sufficiently well-established to
support a participation rights claim for many communities
suffering from water stress and in search of legal avenues for

373. See Timothy Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, 22 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 315, 344 (2009) (noting that many nations do not recognize the
public trust doctrine).
374. See THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
CIVIL LAW 63 (1999) (discussing the origins of the public trust doctrine); accord
Takacs, supra note 335, at 713–15 (detailing the history of the public trust
doctrine beginning with Emperor Justinian); Dowie, supra note 52 (outlining
the public trust doctrine’s origins in sixth-century Rome).
375. See Mulvaney, supra note 373, at 344 (“The law in most nations
recognizes some form of the public trust doctrine[.]”); accord Phillippe Cullet,
Water Law in a Globalized World: The Need for a New Conceptual Framework,
23 J. ENVTL. L. 233, 242 (2011) (describing the public trust doctrine as seeking
to recognize water rights as requiring regulation and governance and noting the
system has the potential to limit arbitrary state action); Stephen McCaffrey,
International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, 31
NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 147 (1991) (suggesting a global public trust doctrine as
one way to protect common resources).
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redress or reform.376 And what is a participation right, if not the
fiduciary duty owed by the state to honor and not unreasonably
interfere with interests held by its citizens?
Second, a participation right in water based on the public
trust doctrine constitutes a misapplication of the public trust
doctrine. The public trust doctrine is most commonly asserted by
the state in an effort to exert control over natural resources,
impose environmental protections, or avoid claims for
compensation related to takings of natural resources.377
Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine is meaningless as a “trust”
if there is no corresponding fiduciary duty of the state in
managing resources held in trust, and no such fiduciary duty can
meaningfully exist without the possibility of beneficiaries of the
public trust enforcing that duty in court.378
Perhaps the most obvious objection to a participation rights
approach to water policy, both in general and specifically an
approach based on the public trust doctrine, is that a
participation right does not actually require the delivery of
sufficient clean water. So long as governments provide due
process and avoid authorizing unreasonable or nonbeneficial uses
of water, there is no recourse for those suffering from water
stress against their government.379 A person may not be
discriminated against, be deprived of property without due
process, or have their freedom of religion circumscribed, but still
376. See Ved. P. Nanda & William K. Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
291, 315 (1976) (citing Chile and Libya as examples of nations not recognizing
the public trust doctrine).
377. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892) (holding
the State of Illinois holds fee simple in the lake bed of Lake Michigan and the
City of Chicago has the exclusive right to develop Chicago’s harbor).
378. See Arnold, supra note 114, at 849 (describing the American legal
system as struggling with multiple theories on water management, including
the public trust doctrine, which requires the government and collective citizenry
to be responsible stewards of water resources); Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to
Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust
Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 843 (2010) (referencing the Alaska Supreme Court
as defining the public trust doctrine as the state holding “resources in trust for
public use and owing a fiduciary duty to manage these resources for the common
good”).
379. See Sax, supra note 51, at 471 (describing potential limited
governmental responsibilities under a public trust doctrine).
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be dying of thirst or cholera. Such a person is, in effect, reading
Pushkin without boots on his feet. A participation right in water
may maintain and improve control over water resources, but it
fails to ensure provision. The next Subpart will address how a
participation rights approach can do more than merely secure a
degree of control, but instead can achieve equitable, sustainable,
and affordable provision of sufficient clean water.
C. A Participation Right in Water and Water Provision
A participation right in water is more than a simple strategic
decision of selecting the immediately binding and enforceable
right. It is also more than the cautious approach of avoiding
issues of sustainability while still making use of rights-based
norms and rhetoric.380 A participation right in water would lead
to equitable, sustainable, and affordable provision of sufficient
clean water by fostering participatory governance in formulating
and implementing water policy. A participation right in water
gives those suffering most from water stress the necessary legal
leverage to secure a place at the stakeholder table in water policy
development.
This leverage facilitates a broadly inclusive stakeholder
group, with the least advantaged empowered by an enforceable
participation right. This inclusivity in participatory governance
facilitates the kind of public discourse and generation of binding
norms associated with the constructivist approach discussed
above.381 Individuals or communities suffering from water stress
who may otherwise be marginalized in water policy development
use the participation right in water to enforce a transparent and
inclusive process.382 Such a process builds a “normative
community” within which values of equity and sustainability
develop organically, ultimately leading to equitable and
380. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (arguing that
participation rights are citizen’s rights that serve as protection against
government interference except in small, legally derived instances).
381. See supra note 343 and accompanying text (defining constructivism as
“[s]upranational organizations teach[ing] national governments how to govern
by means of developing and encouraging international discourse and norms”).
382. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 15–17 (describing examples of models for
greater participation and the help these models bring to poorer communities).
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sustainable water policy and provision of sufficient and affordable
clean water.383 This process has been observed in terms of
building normative communities valuing ecosystem services
provided by wetlands, which ultimately evolve into regulatory
protections for threatened ecosystems.384 A participation rights
approach could be best suited for ensuring diverse- and
representative-stakeholder participation because of the focus of
participation rights on equal protection and nondiscrimination
norms.385 A similar process could be applied to the valuation of
drinking water resources and infrastructure, building toward
greater acceptance of water pricing, conservation, and cost
recovery measures, decreasing illegal connections, and increasing
political support for capital expenditures to improve and
maintain water infrastructure.386 The procedural remedies for
violations of the participation right in water thus lead to changes
in public discourse and values and, ultimately, to substantive
improvements in policies addressing water stress.
A provision rights approach is arguably a more integrated,
centralized approach, whereas the participation rights approach
is iterative and piecemeal. A participation rights approach may
address the most egregious cases of water-policy injustice, such
383. See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International
Cooperation, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 56–57 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe
Hirsch eds., 2004) (describing progressively binding norms forming
incrementally through increasingly stringent treaty systems to which countries
agree after growing accustomed to the previous treaty).
384. See Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and
Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L. L. 26, 56–57
(1997) (evaluating, empirically, how improved procedures and access to
stakeholder processes increased public participation at the local level in
wetlands management, ultimately leading to improved substantive outcomes in
resource management).
385. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 15 (suggesting that a transparent process
for distributing water rights “with significant participation by private owners
would produce better outcomes than the current norm of favoring political and
economic elites” as it incentivizes wider participation and reduces corrupt
government influences).
386. See id. at 15–16 (arguing that mass participation in the water market
would decrease externalities, limit value-decreasing fights among interested
groups (therefore stabilizing valuations), and remove value calculation
responsibilities from partisan political bodies). Citizens would allocate water
through price policies based on collective societal values. Id.
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as disconnection or rate increases on ethnic, religious, or political
grounds, but fails to expand and maintain access to clean,
sufficient, affordable, and sustainable water for all.387 Distinct
communities facing different water challenges would bring claims
of a participation right to water, each requiring redress
individually without a holistic, coordinated approach typical of a
centralized provision right. However, such an iterative approach
allows for nuanced and adaptive consideration of localized
conditions and encourages broad stakeholder participation in
water policy development, thereby developing informal norms
that ultimately translate into enforceable rights and duties.388
Beyond
facilitating
participatory
and
transparent
governance, a participation rights approach to water policy also
facilitates policy experimentation. Experimentalism is a part of
so-called “new governance” methods adapted from the industrial
management context.389 Rather than the top-down hierarchical
approach typical of government, and illustrated by the
centralized character of a provision rights approach to water
policy, new governance adopts an adaptive and collaborative
model.390 New governance approaches favor process-oriented
387. See id. (noting potential failures of a system where citizens are the
owners of water—as opposed to the government—including inevitably that those
who want to consume more will simply be able to purchase it).
388. See id. (noting that broader inclusion through property rights leads to
increased participation); Brunnee & Toope, supra note 384, at 31–33 (discussing
how broader participation can lead to the establishment of legally enforceable
rights). Brunnee and Toope, in writing about a constructivist approach to
freshwater ecosystem preservation, refer to these normative communities as
“contextual regimes,” in which informal norms evolve into legally binding
norms. Id. at 33.
389. See Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for
the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 351, 393–94 (2008) (“Experimentalist approaches are part of a
constellation of so-called ‘new governance’ methods originally advocated in
industrial and managerial context, and since applied to fields including
government regulation of social problems.” (citation omitted)); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 92–93
(1997) (advocating experiments in agency governance that facilitate
collaboration between agencies and private interests as a means of field testing
regulatory policies).
390. See Klein, supra note 389, at 394 (“Instead of a top-down, hierarchical
rule-based system . . . the new governance school posits a more participatory
and collaborative model of regulation in which multiple stakeholders, including,
depending on the context, government, civil society, business and nonprofit
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strategies, similar to the remedies associated with a participation
right in water based on the public trust doctrine.391
Encouraging policy experimentation is also part of the new
governance approach, as is “adaptive management,” the resource
management
decision-making
corollary
of
policy
392
Adaptive management is “a systematic
experimentation.
process for continually improving management policies and
practices by learning from the outcomes of implemented
management strategies.”393 This experimental and adaptive
approach requires multiple institutions or jurisdictions
implementing different, parallel strategies to achieve the same
policy end.394 These separate institutions or jurisdictions collect
data and compare costs, benefits, and outcomes, including
evaluating whether success or failure can be reproduced in other
institutions or jurisdictions or if success or failure could be
attributed to unique localized or institutional issues.395

organizations, collaborate to achieve a common purpose.”).
391. See id. (“In order to encourage flexibility and innovation, ‘new
governance’ approaches favor more process-oriented policy strategies like
disclosure requirements, benchmarking and standard-setting, audited selfregulation, and the threat of imposition of default regulatory regimes to be
applied where there is a lack of good-faith effort at achieving desired goals.”).
392. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 430–31
(2004) (describing adaptive management as employing advanced strategies for
monitoring and governing resource use and involving multiple public and
private entities); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 439 (1998) (discussing experimental
agency branches).
393. Rhett B. Larson, Innovations and International Commons: The Case of
Desalination Under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 800 (2012)
(quoting Claudia Paul-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive Management of
Water Facing Climate and Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCE MGMT. 49, 51
(2007)); see also DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL
GUIDE v (2009) (stating that adaptive management is “a decision process that
promotes flexible decision making that can be adjusted in the face of
uncertainties as outcomes from management actions and other events become
better understood . . . . It is not a ‘trial by error’ process, but rather emphasizes
learning while doing” (citations omitted)).
394. See Klein, supra note 389, at 395 (describing institutions implementing
parallel policies to achieve similar ends, creating increased data and allowing
citizens to assess the utility of government services).
395. See id. (describing an experimentalist program).
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Courts operating under an experimentalist approach,
including a participation right in water based on the public trust
doctrine, do not come up with a one-size-fits-all, once-and-for-all
solution, but instead enforce a participatory, deliberative process
in each individual case.396 Where individual cases are resolved
differently based on that process and data is gathered, analyzed,
and compared to approaches in other cases, best practices for
individual institutional and local conditions will develop and
become evident.397 Where local water management institutions
fail to engage in this participatory experimentalist approach,
courts can impose best practices from other outcomes until the
proper process is completed.398 In this sense, an experimentalist
and constructivist approach is procedural because courts ask
“what entities, jurisdictions, and agencies did to look for
solutions, rather than whether the solutions were the right
ones.”399 This relieves the court from having to make the sort of
technical determinations for which the South African
Constitutional Court considered courts so ill-suited in its decision
in Mazibuko.400
There is some evidence that an approach of court
enforcement of procedures based on these theories of new
governance and constructivism yield positive results in water
396. See id. at 396 (arguing that a court “in an experimentalist system . . .
does not come up with once-and-for-all solutions to threats against individual
rights” but, rather, assesses individual cases and ensure the state is engaging in
a deliberative process).
397. See id. (“[W]here entities engage in the required consultative and
deliberative process, generate enough data on the effectiveness of their chosen
mechanisms to make rolling best practice standards possible, and adopt the best
practices of other localities or justify deviations, courts will defer to these
choices.”).
398. See id. (“Where local entities fail to engage in the experimentalist
project, a court can impose a ‘penalty default’—its own benchmark or
minimum—using whatever evidence is available to it in the litigation or, where
possible, with reference to those generated from other localities’ experiments.”).
399. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Dorf & Sabel, supra note 392, at 286–87). But see
John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and
Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 457–60 (2006) (noting the limitations
of a decentralized participatory approach).
400. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 30 para.
61 (S. Afr.) (“[I]t is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic right
entails . . . .”).
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policy. Commentators have noted the success of the European
Union (EU) Water Framework Directive in establishing an
enforceable right of stakeholders to participate in the
development of water policy, and that such enforcement has
improved access and sustainability.401 The success of a
participatory, localized, and experimental process based on
constructivist theories and new governance approaches is not
unique to the EU.402 An empirical analysis of forty-seven case
studies around the world involving a similar approach has
demonstrated improvements in indicia of sustainable
environmental stewardship.403
A rights-based approach to water policy is not about an
expansive interpretation of “rights” but is about participatory
governance.404 Without the legal leverage of rights, marginalized
individuals and communities have limited recourse and little
voice in addressing the impacts of water stress, which are
disproportionately felt by the disenfranchised or economically
disadvantaged.405 An enforceable participation right in water
empowers disadvantaged groups to influence water policy
without requiring unsustainable water provision that fails to
account for localized conditions.406 The growing global water crisis
401. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 580–82 (2007)
(describing the Water Framework Directive as an example of new governance,
which increases recognition of participation rights).
402. See Jens Newig & Oliver Fritsch, Environmental Governance:
Participatory, Multi-Level—and Effective? 197–214 (Leibniz Information Centre
for
Economics,
Paper
No.
15/2008,
2009),
available
at
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44744 (analyzing case studies from forty-seven
countries and finding the participation of citizens in natural resource and
sustainability programs improved environmental outcomes).
403. Id. For an illustration of the challenges of implementing a
participatory, localized approach to water management, see Neef, supra note
370, at 89–110 (detailing a comparative case study of water governance in
Thailand and Germany).
404. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 692 (“A participatory
process may be the key to effective implementation of [water] rights”).
405. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining water stress).
406. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 693 (noting governments’
ability to increase their capacity to deliver on citizens’ water rights by
developing collaborative relationships with community leaders and including
communities in decision making so as to extend resources and overcome
capacity barriers).
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is not a crisis of nature or lack of available technology: there is
enough water, and the capacity to produce enough clean water to
meet existing and expected global populations.407 The water crisis
is a “crisis of governance.”408 A participation right in water
facilitates a broadly inclusive normative community by giving the
least advantaged the legal leverage necessary to engage in the
stakeholder process at the local level, thereby promoting an
adaptive and nuanced water policy.
V. Conclusion
A rights-based framework has a potentially important role to
play in advancing sustainable and equitable water policy. The
dominant provision right framework raises serious concerns of
sustainability and enforceability.409 The critical evaluation of the
provision right approach in this Article assumes the typical
framework that fails to appropriately account for full costrecovery and environmental concerns.410 Further research is
needed on whether and how a provision right to water could
potentially be framed to adequately incorporate concerns for full
cost recovery, public health, infrastructure financing, and
environmental sustainability.
A participation rights framework avoids the issues of
sustainability and enforceability associated with the provision
right to water while still maintaining the advantage of a rights407. See Deborah Zabarenko, River Basins Could Double Food Production,
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2011; 10:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
09/27/us-rivers-food-idUSTRE78Q0BZ20110927 (arguing that, while there is
water scarcity in some places, the issue is not actually water scarcity, but the
political will and ability to efficiently and fairly allocate water rights) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
408. See A. Mukherji, Is Incentive Use of Groundwater a Solution to the
World’s Water Crisis?, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 188 (P. Rogers, M
Ramón Llamas & L. Martínez-Cortina eds., 2006) (describing the water crisis as
“mainly a crisis of governance” (internal quotes omitted) (citation omitted)).
409. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text (discussing the
enforceability of a provision right to water, specifically economic and political
limitations and courts’ limited capacity to enforce provision rights and
illustrating these limitations through a discussion of Mazibuko).
410. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text (discussing limitations
of adjudicating provision rights, including courts’ inability to take
environmental and factors into account due to the rigid legal standards applied).
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based framework—that of prioritizing water policy, promoting
equity in water provision, and holding governments accountable
for mismanagement of water resources.411 By grounding the
participation right in water in the public trust doctrine, the
rights-based approach to water policy is inexorably tied to the
most important and difficult consideration to integrate in a
rights-based framework—sustainability.412 More research is
needed into the costs and benefits of different participation rights
approaches to water resource claims and which provide the best
outcomes for disadvantaged people with the fewest costs to the
formulation of an integrated national water policy. In particular,
more research is required to understand how the public trust
doctrine relates to participation rights claims and how different
interpretations and applications of the public trust doctrine in
different jurisdictions could impact the development of a
participation right in water.
The objectives of water policy—clean, sustainable, sufficient,
and affordable water for all—can be facilitated by a participation
right in water. Participatory governance encourages equitable
water provision by empowering the least advantaged suffering
disproportionately from water stress.413 As a right with a
procedural remedy, the participation right in water achieves
these
objectives
without
sacrificing
sustainability
or
enforceability. This is particularly true for a participation right in
water based on the public trust doctrine because that doctrine
imposes an enforceable fiduciary duty on the state to manage
water in a sustainable manner. The participation right in water
thus provides a potentially powerful tool for addressing the global
water-stress crisis.

411. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (arguing that participation
rights, rather than provision rights, involve government forbearance and do not
raise economic and sustainability issues).
412. See supra notes 317–23 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
participation rights doctrine is being integrated into international law via the
public trust doctrine and arguing that this link has helped move environmental
protection policies into the forefront of political debates in some countries).
413. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing Mazibuko, a
primary example of the empowerment of economically disadvantaged
populations challenging established water laws).

